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A PROGRESSNE CONSUMPTION TAX FOR INDNIDUALS: 
AN ALTERNATNE HYBRID APPROACH 
Mitchell L. Engler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been much recent academic and government interest in major 
structural tax reform. 1 Major tax reform involves two primary issues. The 
first concerns the tax base: should the U.S. shift from taxing income to a 
consumption tax?2 The second issue involves the tax rate: should one "flat" 
rate apply or should higher rates apply to individuals with higher amounts 
of the chosen tax base (progressive taxation)? Current deadlock exists be-
tween (i) the seriously flawed existing income tax structure3 and (ii) the 
leading progressive consumption tax proposal-a cash flow tax.4 Despite 
addressing many flaws under the current structure, the cash flow approach 
raises serious offsetting concerns. The unsatisfactory income tax therefore 
remains in place by default. In order to break the current deadlock, I pro-
pose a new progressive consumption tax structure-a hybrid approach-to 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. An 
earlier version of this Article was presented at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law Tax Policy 
Workshop in February 2002. I am grateful for the comments from the workshop participants, especially 
Michael Knoll and Reed Shuldiner. I also benefited greatly from the comments of Terrence Charvat, 
Laura Cunningham, Noel Cunningham, Elia Fischer, Dan Shaviro, and Ed Zelinsky. 
1. See Edmund L. Andrews, White House Floats Idea of Dropping Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
8, 2003, at C14; Daniel Halperin, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium Tax Reform Perspectives: 
Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809 (1999); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, 
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental 
Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2095 (2000); Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Takes Aim at Tax Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2001, at Al, reprinted in 92 TAX NOTES 935 (Aug. 13, 2001). 
2. This concerns the federal government's primary tax revenue source. Less significant amounts of 
revenue are raised from taxes other than the current income tax regime (for example, excise taxes). 
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN, & DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (12th 
ed. 2000). There also has been some recent scholarly interest in a wealth tax base. E.g., Deborah H. 
Schenk, F'oreword to Symposium on Wealth Taxes, 53 TAX L. REV. 257 (2000). Nonetheless, the income 
and consumption bases remain the two primary choices under current consideration as annual taxing 
regimes. See KLEIN ET AL., supra, at 8, 15. 
3. The current structure has some consumption tax features. See infra notes 100, 102 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of retirement savings. The system, therefore, has been called a hybrid 
income/consumption tax. See UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION 
TAX (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper et al. eds., 1988). Consistent with its more common characteriza-
tion, the current structure is referred to as an income tax. 
4. Despite receiving some support, a flat consumption tax is unlikely to generate a consensus due 
to distributional concerns. See infra notes 64, 67 and accompanying text. 
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substantially improve upon current law and existing consumption tax pro-
posals. 
The two components of the new hybrid structure achieve this significant 
advancement. First, consistent with the current income tax structure; wages 
generally would be taxed even if saved for future consumption. As dis-
cussed below, this wage component addresses the most serious concerns 
under the cash flow tax. Second, the hybrid approach would tax the excess 
of (i) savings withdrawals for consumption, over (ii) previously saved 
wages, increased by the risk-free interest return thereon. The structure of 
this non-wage component eliminates the most serious problems under the 
current income tax. The hybrid approach therefore captures the benefits of 
consumption taxation without the disabling problems of the cash flow tax. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly illustrates the basic dif-
ferences among the income tax, the cash flow (consumption) tax, and the 
hybrid (consumption) approach. Part III explains why academics and gov-
ernment officials should reach a consensus to replace the current income tax 
with a progressive consumption tax. Part III first focuses on the serious 
practical shortcomings in income taxation, primarily related to the reporting 
of income and losses when "realized" through a sale or exchange. As shown 
therein, realization-based problems seriously distort the desired allocation of 
the income tax burden. In favorable contrast, both consumption tax alterna-
tives-the cash flow tax and the hybrid approach-eliminate the most seri-
ous realization-based problems. As further discussed in Part III, these prac-
tical income tax problems combine with two theoretical points to establish a 
strong threshold case for consumption taxation. First, prior scholarship has 
shown, ignoring practical distortions, that taxing consumption rather than 
income does not substantially alter the relative tax burdens among individu-
als. Second, prior scholarship is inconclusive as to whether an income or 
consumption tax base is preferable in theory. 
Notwithstanding this strong threshold case, a consensus has yet to form 
around progressive consumption taxation. Part IV explains this result by 
recapping the serious problems raised by prior commentary on the cash flow 
tax, the leading progressive consumption proposal. Part IV exhibits how the 
cash flow taxation problems primarily relate to the absence of tax collec-
tions on saved wages. Specifically, the lack of current tax on saved wages 
raises tax avoidance, transition, and revenue concerns. In addition, a pro-
gressive cash flow tax could impact savings decisions in undesirable ways 
due to the multiple tax rates. 5 These problems have made the move to a con-
sumption tax less attractive. As demonstrated in Part IV, however, the wage 
component of the hybrid approach favorably addresses each of these cash 
flow tax concerns. Part IV also evaluates why the consensus for a progres-
sive consumption tax should finally emerge under the hybrid approach. 
5. Under the cash flow tax, saved wages are generally taxed in the year of consumption rather than 
in the year earned. Thus, there would be a tax impact on savings where the consumption-year tax rate 
differs from the wage-year tax rate. 
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II. BASIC DIFFERENCES AMONG THE INCOME TAX, 
THE CASH FLOW TAX, AND THE HYBRID APPROACH 
1207 
This Part contrasts the basic workings of the income tax, the cash flow 
tax, and the new hybrid approach. The basic differences among the three 
taxes is illustrated in the following example. 
Example 1: Treceives a $100,000 cash salary on 12/31/01. Tinvests 
all after-tax wages in a one-year U.S. Treasury note paying the ten 
percent risk-free rate. T consumes all after-tax proceeds on 
12/31/02. The tax rate is a flat fifty percent. 
A. The Current Income Tax 
Under the present income tax, income receipts are taxed even if saved.6 
T therefore owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the $100,000 wages.7 The re-
maining after-tax wages are used to purchase a $50,000 treasury note on 
12/31/01. T receives $55,000 upon maturity of the note on 12/31/02.8 T 
owes $2,500 tax on the $5,000 of interest income in year 02, leaving 
$52,500 of after.:.tax consumption.9 
B. The Cash Flow Tax 
The cash flow tax makes two primary adjustments to the income tax 
base: (i) an unlimited deduction for savings/investment and (ii) the inclusion 
of savings/investment withdrawals. 10 These adjustments convert the income 
tax base into a consumption tax base. As discussed in greater detail below, 
this Subpart presents the cash flow tax as the leading existing consumption 
tax proposal due to the desire for progressive tax rates. Unlike other con-
sumption tax models such as the retail sales tax, the cash flow tax can apply 
higher rates to individuals with higher consumption levels. 11 
6. As discussed in Subpart III.A, income can be defined as the sum of consumption plus change in 
wealth for the relevant tax period, typically one year. Under current law, there is a limited exception for 
qualified retirement savings. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
7. $50,000 tax= 50% tax rate x $100,000 wages. 
8. $50,000 principal plus $5000 interest (10% x $50,000). 
9. T's investment gain equals the $55,000 investment proceeds less the $50,000 purchase price. 
Tax for year 02 = 50% x $5000. Investment proceeds of $55,000 less $2500 tax = $52,500 of after-tax 
consumption. 
10. Generally, borrowed funds also increase the cash flow tax base, while debt repayments reduce 
the tax base. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of a limited exception. 
11. Under a retail sales tax, businesses collect tax on their sales. As discussed in Subpart IV.A, this 
prevents the application of progressive rates based on each individual consumer's collective consump-
tion for the year. While Example 1 uses a flat tax rate, this assumption was made to focus initially on 
issues other than progressivity. See, e.g., Example 6 in Subpart IV.A (which discusses progressivity 
issues). 
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Under the cash flow tax, T owes zero tax in year 01 since T saves the 
entire wages (i.e., T consumes nothing). 12 T therefore purchases a $100,000 
treasury note on 12/31/01. Treceives $110,000 upon maturity of the note on 
12/31/02. Because T will consume the proceeds on 12/31/02, the full 
$110,000 is included in the year 02 tax base. 13 T pays $55,000 tax, leaving 
$55,000 of after-tax consumption.14 
C. The Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid approach has two components: a current wage tax and an 
adjusted cash flow tax on consumption. The wage component would tax 
earned income regardless of whether saved or consumed. 15 The adjusted 
cash flow component would tax the excess of (i) the current year's con-
sumption, determined as above under the cash flow tax, over (ii) current 
wages. Prior years' saved wages, plus the risk-free return thereon, would be 
deductible under this adjusted cash flow component (to the extent not previ-
ously utilized). A general "basis offset account" would track this carry-
forward amount from year to year on the tax return. 
The basic workings of the hybrid approach are illustrated in Example 1; 
more detailed examples are discussed below in Part IV. T owes $50,000 tax 
in year 01 under the wage tax component. T therefore purchases a $50,000 
treasury note. Like the income tax, T receives $55,000 upon maturity of the 
note on 12/31/02. Unlike the income tax, however, T does not owe any ad-
ditional tax in year 02. T's $55,000 basis offset account fully offsets the 
inclusion of the $55,000 investment proceeds under the adjusted cash flow 
component. The basis-offset account equals $55,000 as of year 02 since (i) 
T saved $50,000 of after-tax wages in year 01, and (ii) the risk-free rate was 
ten percerit for the one-year saving period. 16 T can consume $55,000 in year 
02 (i.e., the full pretax proceeds from the treasury note), thereby matching 
the after-tax consumption under the cash flow tax. 
12. Technically, the wages are included in the cash flow base while T's saving's deduction fully 
offsets the wages. 
13. As discussed above, savings withdrawals increase the cash flow base. T will consume less than 
$110,000 after paying taxes. However, this is irrelevant for the tax base definition. The same result 
generally can be obtained regardless of whether taxes are included in the tax base; only the stated tax 
rate is impacted. For instance, a fifty percent "tax-inclusive" rate on the full pretax amount (i.e., no 
deduction for taxes paid) can be expressed as an equivalent 100% "tax-exclusive" rate (i.e., imposed on 
consumption less taxes). On the above example, applying the fifty percent tax inclusive rate to the full 
$110,000 leaves T with consumption of $55,000. Applying the higher 100% tax exclusive rate leaves the 
same result (T can consume only $55,000 because that amount generates a tax liability of $55,000). The 
tax exclusive rate (E) is derived from the tax inclusive rate (n under the formula E = J/(1 - I). On the 
above numbers, 1.0 = .50/[1 - .50]. As another example, a twenty percent tax inclusive rate can be ex-
pressed as a twenty-five percent tax exclusive rate. E = .20/(1 - .20) = .25. 
14. $55,000 tax = 50% x $110,000. After-tax consumption = $110,000 investment proceeds -
$55,000 tax. 
15. The hybrid approach could continue the current limited exception for qualified retirement sav-
ings. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
16. As discussed above, the basis offset account equals saved wages plus the risk-free return 
thereon. $50,000 x 1.1 = $55,000. 
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In sum, the hybrid approach differs from the cash flow tax in two major 
ways. First, the hybrid approach blocks the use of new savings deductions 
against wages. New savings are deductible under the hybrid approach, but 
only against non-wage consumption (i.e., current consumption in excess of 
current wages). 17 Similar to the cash flow tax (and the income tax), how-
ever, deductions other than new savings could offset wages. 18 
The second difference under the hybrid approach concerns its future al-
lowance for the savings deductions blocked by the wage restriction. Under 
the hybrid approach, these savings deductions carry forward indefinitely to 
subsequent years, with interest, for use against subsequent non-wage con-
sumption. The carry-forward deduction for previously saved wages avoids 
double taxation of such savings ( once when earned under the wage compo-
nent, again when withdrawn for consumption). The additional exemption 
for the risk-free interest return on saved wages preserves the hybrid ap-
proach's status as a consumption tax; i.e., the interest adjustment compen-
sates taxpayers for the earlier taxation of saved wages relative to the cash 
flow tax.19 The hybrid approach, therefore, is a consumption tax in a mean-
ingful sense even though it does not strictly tax consumption; the tax on 
saved wages, with the subsequent exemption for such savings plus interest, 
can be viewed as an advance collection system. 20 Example 1 evidences this 
understanding, as T had equal results under the hybrid approach and the 
17. Debt repayments also are deductible only against non-wage consumption in order to prevent 
taxpayers from avoiding the limitation. For instance, assume T wants to save all of his year 01 wages. T 
cannot avoid current tax on the wages by saving the $100,000, because the savings deduction cannot 
offset wages. T could dodge this limit if interest repayments were deductible against wages. Assume T 
borrows $1,000,000 on 1/1/01 at ten percent, agreeing to repay $1,100,000 on 12/31/01. T invests the 
$1,000,000 in a savings asset that grows in value to $1,100,000 as of 12/31/01. T sells the savings asset 
to repay the loan. The leveraged investment converts the original savings deduction to a debt repayment 
since (i) net savings were reduced to zero ($1,100,000 dissaving from the 12/31 sale of the savings asset 
less the sum of the original $100,000 savings from the wages plus $1,000,000 of additional savings from 
the loan proceeds) and (ii) a net debt repayment of $100,000 was generated ($1,100,000 debt repayment 
on 12/31 less $1,000,000 loan proceeds on 1/1). 
18. In theory, the hybrid (consumption) approach, like the cash flow (consumption) tax, allows 
deductions for the costs of generating wages but not for personal consumption expenditures. However, a 
similar inquiry arises under the income tax. See, for example, discussion in Subpart ill.A defining in-
come as the sum of consumption plus change in wealth. Therefore, the hybrid approach or the cash flow 
approach follows current law on (i) mixed work/consumption items like child-care expenses, commuting 
costs, and so forth and (ii) non-work related items such as charitable contributions. Without necessarily 
endorsing the current treatment of any such item, this assumption recognizes that these issues generally 
do not distinguish the hybrid approach, the income tax, or the cash flow tax. The propriety of the current 
treatment of such items is beyond the scope of this Article. A similar point can be made about invest-
ment-related expenses and other items receiving preferential treatment under current law, for example, 
life insurance. Current law provides cash flow treatment for a limited amount of qualified retirement 
savings and is continued under the hybrid approach. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
19. That is, the cash flow tax defers the tax on saved wages until consumption. Part ill provides an 
alternative way to understand this risk-free adjustment. As discussed therein, the income tax imposes an 
excess burden on the risk-free return to savings, relative to the consumption tax. A current tax on saved 
wages, typically viewed as an income tax feature, can be converted to a consumption tax equivalent 
through an exemption of the risk-free return on after-tax savings. However, see infra notes 164-71 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the possible understatement of the risk-free rate. 
20. In addition to this advance collection feature, the hybrid approach applies progressivity differ-
ently than the cash flow tax. See discussion at Subparts IV.A and IV.D.1. 
1210 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 54:4:1205 
cash flow tax. Further analysis of risky returns in Subpart N .D below pro-
vides additional conceptual support.21 
Ill. CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX 
This Part discusses the consensus potential of a progressive consump-
tion tax. Subpart III.A focuses on the practical reasons supporting this con-
clusion. Income taxation raises serious practical distortions due to its report-
ing of income and loss only when "realized" through a sale or exchange. In 
favorable contrast, both con~umption tax alternatives-the cash flow tax 
and the hybrid approach-largely eliminate these distortions. Subpart III.B 
supplements this rejection of the income tax on practical grounds with two 
theoretical points. First, recent scholarship shows a relatively narrow differ-
ence in theory between individuals' relative tax burdens under a consump-
tion tax and an income tax. Subpart III.B also takes notice of the reasonable 
disagreement between serious tax scholars as to the merits of taxing income 
versus consumption. 
A. Income Tax's Long-Standing Practical Problems 
In theory, an income tax base generally should include the sum of con-
sumption plus change in wealth for the tax period, typically one year.22 Un-
der such an accretion concept, items of gain or loss should be reported in the 
year of accrual. For the reasons developed below, any net increase in the 
value of a taxpayer's assets during the year should be taxed, even if not yet 
converted to cash. 23 
In practice, however, the income tax has never implemented such accre-
tion or "mark-to-market" treatment.24 Such failure is attributed primarily to 
the practical difficulties in valuing all assets each year. Additionally, liquid-
ity concerns have been prominent.25 Instead, income generally is included 
21. See, e.g., Example 7 in Subpart IV.D. 
22. Most tax scholars agree that this is the theoretically correct income tax base. E.g., DAVID F. 
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 15-19 (1986). This is often referred to as the "Haig-
Simons" tax base. ROBERT M. HAIG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOME-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS, IN 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed. 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME 
TAXATION 50 (1938); see also infra note 23 (explaining why the Haig-Simons formulation is, in theory, 
the preferred income tax base). 
23. The discussion below provides several perspectives for understanding why a viable income tax 
system requires the accretion concept. At the more basic level, an income tax that includes gain only 
upon sale raises a host of intractable problems. For example, see the discussion throughout Subpart 
ID.A. At a deeper level, as discussed in Subpart ID.B, an income tax imposes an excess burden on the 
risk-free component of the return to savings. However, such a risk-free burden is imposed inequitably 
unless all gains are taxed in the year of accrual. See infra note 205. 
24. The current Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) utilizes mark-to-market treatment, but only in very 
limited circumstances. See I.R.C. § 475 (2002) (securities dealers); id. § 1256 (futures contracts). A 
more universal accretion regime has proven elusive despite the efforts of numerous scholars. Edward A. 
Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997). 
25. See TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 81 (1977) [hereinafter 
2003] A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals 1211 
under current law only when "realized" through a market transaction, for 
example, a sale or exchange. Notwithstanding compelling reasons to reject 
an accretion income tax,26 the realization requirement raises several serious 
problems. Realization allows certain taxpayers to defer their taxes, generally 
without any interest charge.27 Under time value of money principles, such 
taxpayers reduce their tax burdens relative to others. 28 
Example 2 below evidences one particular concern. Taxpayers who de-
fer realization until consumption effectively receive consumption tax treat-
ment. This is problematic because, inter alia, not all taxpayers have equal 
opportunities to defer realization until consumption.29 Thus, shifting to a 
consumption tax would level the playing field for those less able to defer 
realization until consumption. 
Furthermore, Example 3 below demonstrates a more dramatic problem. 
The realization requirement also allows some taxpayers to delay paying 
taxes until after consumption. This results when a taxpayer holds invest-
ments with offsetting gain(s) and loss(es). There is no net economic loss to 
the extent gain on the appreciated investment(s) offsets the loss invest-
ment(s). Nonetheless, such taxpayer can generate a current tax loss by selec-
tively selling only the loss investment (and reinvesting the proceeds). This 
allows consumption without current tax where the tax loss is deductible 
against the income receipts funding consumption. 30 
The following examples illustrate these problems. To highlight the areas 
of exposure, these examples assume in the first instance the lack of any 
BLUEPRINTS]. Liquidity concerns arise since taxpayers would have to pay tax even though they have not 
yet converted their appreciated asset(s) to cash. 
26. In addition to the stated valuation and liquidity concerns, taxpayer compliance may be under-
mined. The average taxpayer might have difficulty in understanding and accepting a tax on "paper 
gains." Zelinsky, supra note 24, at 893-901. But see David Shakow, Taxation without Realization: A 
Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) (concluding that the obstacles to accrual 
taxation largely are surmountable). 
27. While current law occasionally imposes an interest charge, a more universal interest charge is 
hampered by the same key practical problem underlying the realization requirement. Charging interest 
for the deferral period requires knowledge of when the gain accrued; determining the timing of gain 
accrual requires annual valuation. For a more detailed discussion, see Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis 
Indexation: An Implicit Response to Tax Deferral, 53 TAXL. REv. 177, 180-82 (2000). 
28. Under time value of money principles, deferring a $ 100 tax liability reduces the current cost 
below $100 if the government does not charge interest on the deferred tax liability. Where interest is not 
imposed, an amount less than $100 can be set aside today to satisfy the future $100 liability (since the 
lesser amount can be invested and earn interest). 
29. Thus, those fortunate enough to defer realization until consumption have relatively lower bur-
dens than those who realize income before consumption. See infra note 32 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of possible deferral opportunities on earned income. On the other hand, if all taxpayers could 
defer tax until consumption with proper tax planning, choosing an income tax over a consumption tax 
would be merely a trap for the unwary. The undertaking of transactions solely to avoid tax also raises 
efficiency issues. 
30. As shown in Example 3, this defers the tax without necessarily eliminating it. The taxpayer 
continues to hold assets with unrealized gain (i.e., an imbedded tax liability). A sale of such appreciated 
assets would trigger the deferred tax. Nonetheless, the taxpayer has reduced his tax liability through the 
interest-free deferral beyond consumption. In addition, see infra note 118 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the possibility that the tax liability would be eliminated by virtue of the taxpayer's insol-
vency. 
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government responses. The impacts of protective provisions are addressed 
after Example 4. 
Example 2: Realization Income Tax as a Consumption Tax-T per-
forms services in year 01 for his wholly owned business. The ser-
vices increase the value of the business by $100,000 as of 12/31/01 
(i.e., matching T's labor income in Example 1). Rather than draw-
ing a salary, T retains such $100,000 value in the business, hoping 
to receive a positive return on the new capital value during year 02. 
The value of the business increases by $10,000 in year 02 (match-
ing the ten percent return on the treasury note investment in Exam-
ple 1). T realizes all value by selling the business for $110,000 on 
12/31/02. T consumes all after-tax proceeds on 12/31/02. 
Under the realization income tax, T owes no tax in year 01 because he 
has not realized his labor income.31 This allows continued investment of the 
full $100,000 value in the business. T realizes $110,000 of income in year 
02 upon the sale of the business. T pays $55,000 tax in 02, leaving $55,000 
for consumption. Recall the results of Example 1 where T similarly per-
formed $100,000 of services in year 01 and received a ten percent invest-
ment return for year 02. T's after-tax consumption was $55,000 under the 
consumption tax, but only $52,500 under the income tax. In Example 2, T's 
results under the realization income tax therefore match the consumption 
tax.32 
Example 3-Consumption without Current Tax: assume the same 
facts as Example 2 except T also holds two offsetting investments. 
Investment #1 is worth $110,000 more than its purchase price; in-
vestment #2 is worth $110,000 less than its original cost. T sells in-
vestment #2 on 12/31/02, immediately reinvesting the proceeds. 
Despite selling his business to fund consumption in year 02, T owes no 
tax that year since the $110,000 realized loss on investment #2 offsets the 
$110,000 business sale gain.33 T has $110,000 of after-tax proceeds avail-
able for consumption in year 02. The tax has not been completely avoided 
since a sale of the appreciated investment #1 in the future would trigger tax 
31. Assume the business itself did not realize any income by selling products or other transactions. 
Rather, the increase in value was reflected in the appreciation of business assets, including possibly 
goodwill. 
32. This example illustrates deferral of only labor income since the investment return was realized 
in the year of accrual. A similar concern arises where investment return is not realized in the year of 
accrual (for example, the taxpayer holds appreciated investment assets at year-endr 
In addition to this example's specific factual situation, a realization income tax provides taxpayers 
other opportunities to defer tax on their labor income until consumption. See infra note 105; see also 
infra note 42. 
33. Under the realization requirement, the excess of purchase price over sales proceeds constitutes a 
tax loss. 
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on the investment gain. Nonetheless, the interest-free deferral of the 
$55,000 tax liability until after consumption reduces its true cost.34 
Finally, the capital gains preference presents a related realization prob-
lem. Realization creates a lock-in scenario for taxpayers who would like to 
shift their savings from an appreciated asset to a new investment. There is a 
tax incentive to maintain the current investment: continued interest-free 
deferral of the tax on the gain. Prior commentary shows that such lock-in 
arguably supports a lower capital gains rate for investment assets under the 
income tax; i.e., a lower rate reduces the tax incentive to retain appreciated 
assets.35 However, the lower capital gains rate under current law generates 
other serious distortions. The following example illustrates these concerns. 
Example 4: assume the same facts as Example 2 except (i) a twenty-
five percent capital gains rate applies to all investment returns, (ii) T 
sells his business for its $100,000 value on 12/31/01 ( to isolate the 
preference issue by removing any deferral benefit), and (iii) T rein-
vests the sales proceeds from the business in a ten percent treasury 
note like Example 1. 
Despite realizing the full $100,000 income in year 01, T's after-tax con-
sumption increases relative to the consumption tax. T's after-tax funds on 
12/31/01 are $75,000 since the $100,000 labor income is taxed at the 
twenty-five percent capital gains rate. The labor income was reported as 
investment gain since it was realized from the sale of the business. T pur-
chases a $75,000 treasury note, which pays $82,500 on 12/31/02.36 T owes 
$1875 tax on the $7500 of investment return, leaving $80,625 of after-tax 
consumption. 37 
A realization income tax could, and the current law does, attempt to 
protect against these realization shortcomings. 38 Such current protections 
34. It is also possible that the taxpayer ultimately will not pay the $55,000 tax liability. This could 
occur where the taxpayer does not have enough assets to repay the deferred tax when the appreciated 
asset is sold. The problem arises where the taxpayer's portfolio is funded with obligations owed to other 
parties. If so, outside lenders might have priority over the government on the sales proceeds. Thus, the 
government will collect only if T has other assets remaining in the year of sale. See infra note 118 and 
accompanying text. Independently, complete tax avoidance also is possible under current law due to the 
"basis step-up" rule at death (eliminating built-in investment gains at death). I.RC. § 1014 (2002). 
35. From a fairness perspective, earlier tax collections at a lower rate might be preferable to waiting 
for a possible later collection at a higher rate. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case 
for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 321 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary, 
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 396, 417 (1993). See infra note 52 and accompany-
ing text (offering another justification for the capital gains preference under the income tax and why 
consumption taxes generally remove such justifications). 
36. $75,000 X J.J. 
37. Tax= .25 x $7500 = $1875. $82,500 investment proceeds less $1875 tax= $80,625. This as-
sumes that the interest income qualifies for the lower capital gains rate. As discussed infra note 40 and 
accompanying text, interest does not qualify for the lower rate under current law. Even with the interest 
taxed at the regular rates, T's position is still improved relative to the consumption tax. In addition, as 
discussed at Subpart N.E, some taxpayers attempt, under current law, to convert interest returns to 
capital gains. 
38. Consider also the income tax's long-standing failure to reduce nominal gains by the inflationary 
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include: (i) the government's ability to impute salary income to business 
owners in the absence of adequate compensation payments, (ii) a one-year 
holding requirement for the favorable capital gains rates, 39 (iii) the denial of 
the capital gains rate for interest income,40 and (iv) limitations on the ability 
to use investment losses.41 Serious concerns nonetheless remain for several 
reasons. 
First, given the inevitable gaps in coverage, the tax avoidance possibili-
ties suggested above remain ready for exploitation (i.e., deferral of labor 
income and/or investment return, conversion of labor income and/or interest 
income to capital gains).42 fu this regard, each example showed the income 
tax's shortcomings in isolation (for example, either deferral or the preferen-
tial rate, but not both together). Even assuming partial blockage of each 
strategy, taxpayers can link the remaining availability of the different strate-
gies.43 As a related distributional point, the wealthy tend to disproportion-
component. While marginal rate brackets are increased for inflation, this is conceptually distinct from 
the failure to reduce nominal gain for inflation. See Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. 
REV. 537, 542-45 (1993). Such over-taxation does not raise direct tax avoidance concerns. Nonetheless, 
this is another income tax weakness since the tax burden unfairly varies with the amount of inflation. See 
Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAXL. REV. 17, 
39-43 (1996). In addition, such shortcoming might raise indirect tax avoidance concerns by allowing an 
argument by capital gains proponents that a lower rate is needed to offset the excess inclusion of the full 
nominal gain. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 35, at 337 ("[O]ne of the principal arguments used 
to support the preference is that capital gains are largely inflationary."). However, a lower capital gains 
rate is a poor offset to the taxation of inflationary gain. Id. at 338-41. Similarly, the excess inclusion of 
the full nominal gain arguably offsets tax deferral under the realization requirement. Taxation of nominal 
gain is also a poor offset to realization deferral. See Engler, supra note 27, at 198-99 n.115. 
39. I.R.C. §§ l(h)(l), 1222 (2002). 
40. Id. § 1222 (requiring gain from sale or exchange); see also id. § 1271 (treating certain income 
from debt instruments-including payments on sale or exchange-as ordinary income, rather than long-
term capital gain). 
41. There are several limits on realized losses. First, realized capital losses generally are deductible 
only against capital gains plus $3,000 of ordinary income each year. Id. § 1211(b). Second, I.R.C. § 
1091 "wash sale" rules disallow losses on the sale of stock/securities where substantially identical 
stock/securities are purchased within thirty days of the Joss sale date (backwards or forwards). I.R.C. § 
1091 (2002). Third, I.R.C. § 1092 "straddle" rules defer realized losses to the extent the taxpayer holds 
"offsetting positions" with matching amount of unrealized gain. Id. § 1092. An "offsetting position" 
exists under § 1092(c)(2)(A) "if there is a substantial diminution of the taxpayer's risk of loss [on the 
asset sold for a loss]." Id.§ 1092(c)(2)(A). 
42. For instance, salary imputation requires enforcement resources by the Internal Revenue Service 
and is further hampered by the difficulty in ascertaining the true labor component in the absence of a 
market transaction. In this regard, note the difficulty even in theory, let alone practice, of separating the 
labor component from capital component in the development of a patent etc. See infra note 157 and 
accompanying text. In addition, sophisticated taxpayers might use leveraged acquisitions to convert 
labor income to investment return potentially (i) receiving preference rates and/or (ii) skirting limits on 
offsetting labor income with selectively realized losses. Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis Indexation: 
Tax Arbitrage and Related Issues, 55 TAX L. REV. 69, 93-104 (2001); Shuldiner, supra note 38, at 646. 
Taxpayers similarly might avoid the straddle rules by investing in comparable companies. See Daniel 
Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 665-68 (1995). 
43. For instance, assume the same key underlying facts as the prior examples: (i) T earns a $100,000 
salary in year 01 and (ii) all (after-tax) earnings as of 12/31/01 generate a ten percent return for the one-
year investment period. Also assume Example S's twenty-five percent capital gains rate and that T real-
izes his ten percent investment return as capital gains rather than interest income. Finally, assume T can 
defer only half of his earned income from year O 1 to 02 and that only true investment return qualifies for 
the twenty-five percent rate. T owes $25,000 tax in year 01 (50% x $50,000 wages), leaving $75,000 for 
investment as of 12/31/01. The invested $75,000 grows to $82,500 ($75,000 x 1.1) as of 12/31/02. T 
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ately benefit from these shortcomings.44 Second, "non-abusive" transactions 
still can benefit from the lower tax burden.45 Third, the protective provisions 
add significant complexity and require enforcement resources.46 Finally, the 
protections often are too broad, unfairly overtaxing certain taxpayers.47 In 
sum, the realization requirement has been called the Achilles heel of the 
income tax for excellent reasons.48 
In favorable contrast, the hybrid approach and the cash flow tax gener-
ally eliminate the realization-based problems.49 First, consider Example 2 
where T deferred his earned income from year 0 1 to year 02. Compare T to 
other taxpayers who similarly earn $100,000 of labor income in year 01 and 
defer consumption for one year at the ten percent risk-free rate. Under the 
realization income tax, those capable of utilizing the deferral strategy have 
after-tax consumption of $55,000 while those unable to defer realization 
consume only $52,500. In favorable contrast, all such similarly situated 
taxpayers would have $55,000 of consumption under the hybrid approach or 
the cash flow tax.50 
owes additional tax of (i) $25,000 on the $50,000 of deferred wages, and (ii) $1,875 on the $7,500 true 
investment return [25% x ($82,500 - $75,000)]. This leaves T with $55,625 of consumption (and no 
further tax liability), more than the $55,000 under either of the two consumption tax alternatives. T came 
out ahead of the consumption tax even though: (i) realization was deferred on only half the labor income 
and (ii) no labor income qualified for the capital gains rates. The results would be more dramatic if T 
received a higher risky investment return on invested capital. 
More generally, aggressive taxpayers attempt to skirt the protective provisions. For instance, a suc-
cessful "conversion" of ordinary income to capital gains through a conversion transaction provides two 
potential benefits: (i) taxation of the ordinary income at the lower capital gains rate and/or (ii) the ability 
to offset such ordinary income with realized capital losses (thereby avoiding the general prohibition on 
using capital losses against ordinary income). See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
44. See George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing Direct Consumption Taxes in 
Developing Countries, 46 TAX L. REV. 405, 436 (1991) ("[I]ncome taxes in practice are commonly 
replete with tax preferences for capital income that are of little benefit to the average taxpayer, but en-
able the wealthy to lower their tax burdens dramatically."). 
45. For example, gain on a long-term stock investment receives the dual benefit of deferral and the 
lower capital gains rate. 
46. Shuldiner, supra note 38, at 646; Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and 
Retrospective Taxation: The Problem with Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 201-02 
(1997). 
47. Consider, for example, the I.R.C. rule limiting investment losses to only $3000 of earned in-
come. I.R.C. § 121l(b) (2002). Consider a taxpayer who earns $100,000 salary and sells his only in-
vestment for a $100,000 loss. Although the taxpayer has true net income of $0, he reports $97,000 of net 
income due to the loss limitation rule. While the $97,000 unused loss carries forward for use in subse-
quent years, the taxpayer is not fully compensated under time value of money principles since the loss is 
not adjusted for interest. 
48. WILLIAM T. ANDREWS, The Achilles Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278, 280-85 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. 
Bloomfield eds., 1983). 
49. See Knoll, supra note 46, at 207 n.49, 220 n.84 (discussing the cash flow consumption tax). See 
infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing a related, but more narrow problem under the con-
sumption taxes); see also infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (regarding imprecision due to pro-
gressive tax rates which cannot be completely eliminated under an income or consumption tax). 
50. Please see calculations above for each approach in Example 1 and see Part IV for possible 
divergences between the two consumption tax approaches where progressive rates and/or risky returns 
apply. See Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Con-
sumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53, 66-68 (2003) (offering an explanation of why the consumption taxes 
generally eliminate the time value of money significance of realization and how consumption taxes 
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Consider next Example 3 where T sold only his losing investment. This 
selective loss strategy increased T's after-tax consumption to more than 
$55,000 under the realization income tax. In favorable contrast again, such 
sale would not generate any tax loss under either the hybrid approach or the 
cash flow tax.51 Both taxes therefore eliminate this selective loss concern. 
Finally, recall the capital gains problems evidenced by Example 4. Recall 
how the lock-in problem under the realization income tax arguably supports 
the capital gains preference as a "second-best" response. The two consump-
tion taxes eliminate the potential second-best arguments favoring a capital 
gains preference. In particular, selling appreciated assets for reinvestment 
generally would no longer generate any tax liability. 52 Thus, the capital 
gains preference has no place under the hybrid approach or the cash flow 
tax. Accordingly, both forms of consumption taxation should remove the 
problems raised by Example 4. 
B. Supplementary Theoretic Support for Replacing the Income Tax 
The merits of taxing income versus consumption have been debated for 
a long time. The traditional concepts of the income and consumption taxes 
initially suggested a very significant difference between the two taxes, in 
theory. Traditionally, the income tax was distinguished from the consump-
tion tax through its "double taxation of saving."53 This label follows from 
Example 1 above where the saved wages were taxed initially upon receipt 
and a subsequent tax was imposed on the investment return as well. In con-
trast, the conventional cash flow consumption tax imposes only a single tax 
(upon consumption). The "double taxation of savings" label suggests that 
the income tax imposes an excess burden on all investment return. Assum-
ing the desirability of taxing investment return, such a significant difference 
between the two taxes might sustain the income tax despite its serious im-
plementation flaws discussed above. More recent scholarship demonstrates, 
maintain a present value equivalency of tax burdens under certain assumptions). 
51. Under both taxes, the sale of a loss asset would generate an increase to the tax base if the sales 
proceeds were used for consumption. There generally would not be any increase or decrease if the sales 
proceeds were reinvested; the inclusion of the sales proceeds would be offset by a new savings deduc-
tion. If anything, a sale for reinvestment could increase the base (reinvestment in a consumer durable). 
See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
52. Under both taxes the inclusion of the sales proceeds generally would be offset by new savings 
deductions. A limited exception might arise upon certain reinvestments in consumer durable. This does 
not alter the textual conclusion since, inter alia, either consumption tax version generally would elimi-
nate the current time value of money benefit from deferral. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. In 
addition, continuation of the current exclusion for some gain on a home sale, see I.R.C. § 121 (2002), 
would limit situations where a sale/repurchase could trigger gain. Similarly, consumer durable gain more 
generally could be deferred if reinvested in another durable (through a basis carryover regime). 
The inflationary justification also is neutered since the two consumption taxes exempt the entire 
risk-free return, and not just the inflationary component. See supra note 38 and accompanying text 
(discussing inflationary justification); supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing risk-free exemp-
tion under the consumption taxes). 
53. See, e.g., RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 25-26 (1976) (discussing the fairness 
of the income tax's "double taxation of savings"). 
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however, that a theoretic income tax imposes a much more limited excess 
burden on investment return. In particular, the income tax, in theory, gener-
ally imposes an excess tax burden only on the real risk-free rate of return.54 
The following example illustrates this point. 
Example 5: assume the same facts as Example 1 except, under the 
cash flow tax, T invests $50,000 of the salary in a risky stock (the 
other halfremains invested in the treasury note). The stock doubles 
in value as of 12/31/02. 
Under the cash flow tax, T would have $155,000 of pretax proceeds as 
of 12/31/02: (i) $100,000 stock proceeds and (ii) $55,000 from the treasury 
note. This allows $77,500 of after-tax consumption.55 Assume T invests the 
full $50,000 of after-tax wages under the income tax in the risky stock: i.e., 
matching his risk tolerance under the cash flow tax. T would have after-tax 
proceeds of $75,000: $100,000 pretax proceeds less tax on the $50,000 
gain.56 Despite the "double taxation of savings," T's reduced consumption 
of $2,500 under the income tax e~uals the tax rate times only the risk-free 
return on the $50,000 investment. 7 Historically, the real risk-free rate has 
been a very small component of investment return, with the short-term rate 
averaging around 0.5% over a recent sixty-year period.58 
The second theoretical point involves the merits of the income tax's 
theoretical burden on the risk-free return, assuming away the practical prob-
lems in accretion taxation.59 While such analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article, notice should be taken of the long-running debate. In particular, 
reasonable disagreement remains among serious scholars as to which base is 
preferable, in theory.60 The serious efforts of numerous scholars over many 
54. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt 
Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (summary and conclusions #3). This assumes 
that the theoretic income tax appropriately adjusts for inflation. As shown in the textual example, this 
also assumes that taxpayers make appropriate portfolio adjustments under the income tax. A further 
assumption in certain circumstances is that taxpayers can borrow at the risk-free rate; i.e., where portfo-
lio adjustments require individualized borrowing. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the comparable issue under the hybrid approach). A theoretic income tax therefore could impose 
an additional excess burden, relative to the cash flow consumption tax, on taxpayers with higher borrow-
ing rates in certain circumstances. However, such potential excess tax burden has been criticized because 
it varies based on taxpayers' individual borrowing rates. See Cunningham, supra note 38, at 35-39. 
Furthermore, such burden can be maintained by forms of consumption taxation other than the cash flow 
tax, such as the hybrid approach. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
55. $155,000 - ($155,000 X .5) = $77,500. 
56. $25,000 tax= 50% tax rate x ($100,000 stock value - $50,000 purchase price). 
57. $77,500 - $75,000 = $2,500. $2,500 = 50% tax rate x 10% risk-free rate x $50,000. See infra 
notes 144-49 and accompanying text (offering a deeper explanation of this result). 
58. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Con-
sumption Tax A Debate about Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 387-90 (1992) (for a detailed 
analysis of the real risk-free rate). 
59. See supra note 25 and accompanying text regarding the practical reasons supporting realization 
taxation. 
60. Compare Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 1006-16 
(1992) (rejecting attempts to justify a consumption tax on grounds that it preserves savers' relative 
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years have failed to generate a decisive winner between the income and 
consumption bases, even ignoring the income tax's serious practical prob-
lems. 61 
C. Summary 
The foregoing theoretical and practical points establish a strong thresh-
old case for the consumption tax. The income tax imposes a relatively nar-
row excess burden on investment return, even in theory, and reasonable 
doubts remain as to the desirability of such burden. Serious implementation 
problems further allow select taxpayers to (i) avoid the relatively light ex-
cess burden on investment return62 and (ii) reduce their taxes on other in-
come (e.g., wages).63 
In sum, those favoring the income tax in theory should consider instead 
a consumption tax with progressive rates. Progressive rates satisfy the desire 
to impose proportionately higher tax burdens on the wealthy.64 The progres-
sive consumption tax also must avoid problems comparable to those high-
lighted under the income tax. Depending on its structure, a consumption tax 
therefore has the potential to satisfy, in practice, both theoretic consumption 
tax and income tax advocates.65 With these goals in mind, Part IV demon-
strates the advantages of the hybrid approach relative to the cash flow tax. 
IV. BENEFITS OF THE HYBRID APPROACH OVER THE CASH FLOW TAX 
A clear consensus for the progressive consumption tax has failed to 
emerge despite the strong threshold case delineated above. Prior commenta-
tors have raised serious concerns about the cash flow tax, which is the lead-
ing progressive consumption tax proposal.66 These problems have decreased 
pretax positions), with Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 356-57 
n.158 (2000) (critiquing Professor Fried's analysis). 
61. See Bankrnan & Griffith, supra note 58, at 406 (noting that arguments by consumption tax 
proponents that the income tax's burden on interest is unfair and inefficient "have been ably, but for the 
most part, inconclusively, rebutted by defenders of the income tax"). 
62. See, e.g., Example 2 under which T matched the consumption tax results, thereby avoiding the 
tax burden on the risk-free return. 
63. See, e.g., Example 3. 
64. Income tax proponents often base their preference on the fact that (i) the income tax imposes an 
additional burden on investment return, and (ii) the wealthy tend to receive higher percentages of in-
vestment income. The income tax's practical problems instruct, however, that distributional goals would 
be better addressed through a progressive consumption tax. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax 
Shelter Rules: Protecting the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859 (1993). Many favoring a con-
sumption tax in theory also prefer progressive rates. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354 (discuss-
ing why "liberal egalitarians" might favor a progressive consumption tax); see also infra note 99. Not 
everyone, of course, prefers progressive rates. See ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 
(1985). Nonetheless, a progressive consumption tax might be a more acceptable c9mpromise to flat tax 
proponents than the current progressive income tax. 
65. As discussed in Subparts IV.A, D, and F.1, even those favoring a consumption tax in theory 
might reject certain forms of consumption taxation. 
66. These concerns are discussed throughout this Part. Other proposals have linked a wage tax with 
a business-level consumption tax. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. The hybrid approach has 
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the attractiveness of a shift to the consumption tax. As shown herein, the 
hybrid approach significantly addresses the problems in cash flow taxation. 
Subpart N.A first discusses how an undesirable impact on risk-free savings 
arises under the progressive cash flow tax. Subpart IV .B addresses tax 
avoidance and evasion issues related to the lack of tax collections on saved 
wages under the cash flow tax. Subpart N.C considers the linked transition 
and revenue concerns that have hindered the cash flow tax. Subpart N.D 
analyzes the treatment of risky returns under the different taxes. After Su-
bart N .E addresses complexity issues, Subpart N .F summarizes the con-
sensus potential of the hybrid approach. 
A. Progressivity Impact on Risk-Free Savings 
A consumption tax consensus likely requires progressive rates to satisfy 
distributional concerns. Wealthy individuals would bear a greater percent-
age of the overall tax burden under a progressive consumption tax than a 
flat consumption tax.67 This progressivity desire, however, conflicts with the 
most straightforward consumption tax model: a "sales" tax collected by 
businesses on sales for consumption.68 Administrative concerns preclude 
tracking each individual's aggregate spending so that the tax could be col-
lected at varying rates (based on each individual's overall spending).69 In a 
significant advancement, the cash flow tax demonstrated how each individ-
ual's consumption could be calculated without tracking expenditure.70 As 
discussed above, this is accomplished through two major modifications to 
the existing income tax base: (i) an unlimited deduction for savings (plus 
debt repayments) and (ii) the inclusion of all savings withdrawals (plus bor-
rowed funds). Progressive rates then could be applied to the individual's 
resulting tax base. 
several advantages over such linked wage and business tax approaches, including the ability to impose 
progressivity on all receipts (not just wages) and avoidance of difficult classification issues regarding 
which activities constitute businesses. 
67. A full discussion of the underlying merits of progressivity is beyond the scope of this Article. As 
discussed supra in note 64 and the accompanying text, there is significant support for progressivity in 
the tax system. 
68. For instance, a retail sales tax could be imposed only upon the ultimate sale for consumption. 
Alternatively, a value-added tax could be imposed at every level of production (typically with offsetting 
deductions or credits at the latter stages of production to minimize double taxation of the same value). 
Thus, in theory, the two forms differ in the timing of the tax collection. 
69. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 383. Applying higher rates to luxury goods (and/or lower rates to 
staples) might achieve some progressivity. This is unsatisfactory, however, for several reasons. First, 
progressivity would turn on how money was spent rather than the amount of consumption. For example, 
the consumption of large amounts of "non-luxury" goods would avoid the progressivity. Second, trou-
bling classification issues arise in determining luxury items. Third, economic inefficiencies arise as some 
consumers substitute "non-luxury" goods for "luxury" items. Id. Issues also arise regarding the treatment 
of services. 
70. A 1974 article by Professor Andrews popularized the cash flow tax in the U.S. legal literature. 
William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 
(1974); see NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955) (containing an earlier discussion of the 
consumption or cash flow tax). 
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The progressive cash flow tax is not without its own problems. Consider 
first the treatment of savings under the progressive cash flow tax. As dis-
cussed more fully below in Subpart N.D, a flat-rate consumption tax gener-
ally can be viewed as implicitly exempting investment return from tax.71 
The consumption tax receives substantial support from this perceived neu-
trality on savings.72 A progressive cash flow tax can deviate significantly 
from this savings neutrality, thereby making the consumption tax less attrac-
tive. 
First, saving wages could increase the tax burden even when invested at 
only the risk-free interest rate. Consider the following example. 
Example 6: T receives a $100,000 salary on each of 12/31/01 and 
12/31/02. A fifty percent rate applies to amounts up to, and includ-
ing, $100,000; additional amounts are taxed at a sixty percent rate. 
T prefers to save all his year 0 1 wages for consumption in year 02, 
investing at the ten percent risk-free rate.73 
Under the cash flow tax, T's tax base includes the $210,000 of pretax funds 
available on 12/31/02: the $100,000 of year 02 salary, the $100,000 of 
saved wages from year 01, and the $10,000 of interest income on the saved 
wages.74 T's tax bill in year 02 is $116,000, leaving $94,000 available for 
consumption.75 Had T not saved, T could have consumed $50,000 each year 
(after paying $50,000 tax each year on the $100,000 of wages). Therefore, 
saving reduced T's overall consumption from $100,000 ($50,000 each year) 
to $94,000. Under a neutral savings regime, however, T's overall consump-
tion would have increased by $5000 because (i) T deferred $50,000 of con-
sumption for one year and (ii) T invested at the ten percent interest rate.76 
Savings neutrality was broken because the saved wages plus interest were 
71. For instance, Thad $55,000 of after-tax consumption in Example 1. The same result would 
occur under a wage tax that explicitly exempted investment return. Under a fifty percent flat rate wage 
tax, T would have paid $50,000 of tax on his $100,000 of wages in year 01. Investing $50,000 for one 
year would have generated $55,000 investment proceeds one year later. No further tax would be imposed 
on the investment return under the wage tax. For a more detailed analysis of risky investment returns, 
see Subpart IV.D. 
72. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 22; see also Rakowski, supra note 60. 
73. The assumption of no consumption in 01 was made for ease of exposition. Even where T con-
sumes a portion of his salary, the more general conceptual point is that unequal spending from year to 
year can lead to a progressivity impact (where the consumption-year tax rate differs from the wage-year 
tax rate). 
74. As shown in Example 1, Tis not taxed in year 01 since the entire wages are saved. 
75. Tax liability= ($100,000 x 50%) + ($110,000 x 60%). $210,000-$116,000 = $94,000. 
76. The $50,000 deferred consumption multiplied by the ten percent investment rate. Under a sav-
ings-neutral wage tax with the same rates, T would pay $50,000 tax in year 01. In year 02, T again would 
owe $50,000 tax on his wages but the investment proceeds (including the gain) would be exempt. This 
would leave $105,000 available for consumption ($50,000 after-tax wages plus $55,000 ($50,000 x 1.1) 
investment proceeds). The textual calculation assumes that interest rates did not rise in response to the 
income tax. 
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consumed in a heavy consumption year, thereby subjecting them to the 
higher sixty percent progressive rate.77 
Next, favorably contrast the results under the hybrid approach. Even 
though T saves all available after-tax wages, T pays $50,000 tax on the 
$100,000 wages in 01 because savings deductions cannot offset wages.78 T 
invests the remaining $50,000, which grows to $55,000 as of 12/31/02.79 
The year 02 hybrid base includes: (i) the $100,000 current-year salary (un-
der the wage component) and (ii) the $55,000 savings withdrawal for con-
sumption (under the adjusted cash flow component).80 However, T can de-
duct his $55,000 basis offset account against the savings withdrawals. The 
original basis offset account was $50,000 since T saved $50,000 in year 
01.81 The ten percent interest adjustment for one year increases the basis 
offset account to $55,000.82 T's tax base is reduced to only the $100,000 of 
wages, thereby generating another $50,000 tax liability. 
T's after-tax consumption in year 02 under the hybrid approach there-
fore equals the savings neutral $105,000: $155,000 pre-tax proceeds less the 
$50,000 tax liability on the current-year wages.83 This resulted since the 
hybrid approach avoided the progressivity impact on the saved wages and 
the interest. Even though these amounts were used for consumption, the 
basis offset account effectively excluded them from the adjusted cash flow 
component of the hybrid approach for year 02. Savings neutrality was, 
therefore, maintained on risk-free returns; the more complicated risky re-
turns are discussed below in Subpart N.D. 
Since T's unequal spending raised the progressivity concern under the 
cash flow tax, the problem might appear negligible under the "life cycle" 
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, savings tend to smooth out annual con-
sumption levels.84 Significant concerns remain nonetheless. First, some 
77. T faced the higher sixty percent rate on $110,000 of his tax base, generating an $11,000 progres-
sivity burden (i.e., the extra ten percent rate x $110,000). The $11,000 equals the sum of his actual 
reduced consumption by virtue of saving ($6000) and the loss of the increased consumption that would 
arise under a savings neutral system ($5000). 
78. 50% x $100,000. As discussed supra at note 18 and accompanying text, other deductions al-
lowed against wages under current law could offset the wages. For ease of exposition, such deductions 
are assumed to be zero. This example also assumes that T paid the $50,000 wage tax in 0 I. See Subpart 
IV.E for possible complications where the 01 tax liability is not paid until 02. 
79. $50,000 X (1.1). 
80. As discussed at Subpart II.C, consumption in excess of wages is included under this second 
component. $155,000 cash flow consumption less $100,000 wages equals $55,000. 
81. The hybrid approach prevented T's $50,000 new savings deduction from offsetting his wages. If 
Thad other savings withdrawals in the current year, the $50,000 alternatively could be used against such 
dissaving. 
82. A one-year interest adjustment was correct since exactly one year elapsed between the 12/31/01 
tax payment and the 12/31/02 savings withdrawal. See Subpart IV.E for more complicated scenarios 
where some events occur on dates other than December 31. 
83. T's consumption should increase from $100,000 to $105,000 where T saves $50,000 for one 
year at a ten percent interest rate. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
84. See Alberto Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate 
Implications and Tests, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 55 (1963). Concerns might be further reduced if there were 
relatively few rate brackets covering large amounts. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: 
the Dubious Link between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197, 222 (1999). Less broad-based brackets 
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spending inequality from year to year is likely and occasionally more sig-
nificant inequalities can arise where savings are used for cars, down pay-
ments on homes, and so forth. 85 
In addition, wealth transfers could make the progressivity concern par-
ticularly acute since significant savings can be transferred at death (rather 
than consumed at more regular levels). Some consumption tax proponents 
couple their advocacy with a wealth transfer tax.86 Such linkage strongly 
appeals under a cash flow tax to preserve taxation of the transferor's earn-
ings at the transferor's tax rate (since the transferor is not otherwise taxed 
on saved wages).87 A comparable argument arises under the hybrid ap-
proach despite its taxation of saved wages; if wealth transfers were exempt, 
a significant tax incentive would arise to characterize wages as investment 
return. 88 Treating wealth transfers as consumption by the transferor keeps 
the cash flow and hybrid systems "closed."89 The view that wealth transfers 
might be desired, however. 
85. The entire purchase price of a car or home would be taxed in the year of purchase notwithstand-
ing the savings element on such consumer durables. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. The 
special treatment of home acquisition indebtedness (and possibly other consumer debt) would respond to 
additional "bunching" concerns on debt-financed acquisitions. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying 
text. 
86. See HENRY J. AARON & HARVEY GALPER, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests, in 
OPTIONS FORT AX REFORM (Joseph A. Pechman ed. 1984 ). 
87. If a tax were imposed only upon the transferee's consumption, wealthy taxpayers could lower 
the tax burden on their heavy earnings by transferring assets to lower-bracket individuals (for example, 
other family members). Insuring ultimate inclusion also preserves the notion that the consumption tax 
burdens the taxpayer's endowments as reflected by receipts. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 38-42 
(offering a discussion of the endowment theory). As possible related support, the failure to tax wealth 
transfers under the cash flow tax might raise concern as to potentially dynastic wealth growing from 
generation to generation without any tax burden (under the cash flow tax). Compare James R. Repetti, 
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001) (concluding that current wealth transfer 
taxes serve a useful role in curbing dynastic wealth). A cash flow tax without a wealth transfer tax would 
exacerbate such concerns even relative to an income tax without a wealth transfer tax. See discussion 
infra note 91. 
88. As discussed below, one attractive feature of the hybrid approach is that the cash flow compo-
nent protects against taxpayer attempts to "convert" wages to investment income. The cash flow compo-
nent provides such protection since paying tax on saved wages reduces future tax liabilities through the 
basis offset account. If wealth transfers are not included in the transferor's tax base, the basis-offset 
account might become irrelevant to the extent a taxpayer transfers wealth. In fact, a strategy of avoiding 
wage characterization could backfire if lump-sum transfers were treated as consumption since they could 
be taxed at a higher marginal rate; i.e., the hybrid approach results would then follow the cash flow tax 
results. 
89. See David A. Weisbach, Ironing out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599 (2000) (discussing 
virtue of closed system in analysis of proposed flat tax). The consumption tax could take the form of a 
separate wealth transfer tax. As discussed above, however, seeing wealth transfers as a potential escape 
hatch from the underlying consumption tax supports an integrated approach. An integrated approach is 
especially compelling under the hybrid approach given the basis-offset account. See discussion infra 
note 88 and accompanying text. Consideration could be given to some limited exclusionary amount for 
wealth transfers. A limited exclusionary amount might be acceptable, especially given that tax avoidance 
would require the taxpayer to transfer wealth (rather than consume himself). 
Even if the wealth transfer tax were integrated into the consumption tax (by treating wealth transfers 
as consumption), some gaps under the current wealth transfer system would remain. For instance, cur-
rent techniques are used to reduce the reported value of transferred assets for transfer tax purposes. Such 
techniques similarly might reduce the reported consumption value on asset transfers under an integrated 
system. Similar issues would arise, however, even under a realization-income tax regime that treated 
wealth transfers as a realization event (contrary to current law). An analysis of valuation concerns in the 
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are a form of consumption provides additional support, although reasonable 
arguments to the contrary have been made.90 (As an aside, while this discus-
sion appropriately focuses on the transferor's treatment, the transferee ar-
guably should be taxed as well.91) 
In sum, assuming wealth transfers are treated as consumption, the pro-
gressivity concern becomes more pronounced under the cash flow tax. The 
cash flow tax could impose an undesirable higher burden on wealth trans-
fers than the hybrid approach since it would include two additional amounts 
in the wealth transfer year: (i) previously saved wages and (ii) the portion of 
investment return equal to the risk-free rate. Thus, the cash flow tax could 
impose a significant progressivity burden on the gradual buildup of even 
modest amounts of wealth (and even in the absence of extraordinary in-
vestment returns). 
Provisions averaging multiple years' tax base amounts might be consid-
ered under the cash flow tax as a response to such progressivity concems.92 
wealth transfer context and potential responses is beyond the scope of this Article. See Laura Cunning-
ham, Remember the AlamD: The IRS Needs Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 
1461 (2000) (offering a discussion of some recent valuation techniques and potential responses). 
90. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 
529 (1996). 
The equality of opportunity distributive justice theory provides related support; i.e., taxation should 
reduce pretax unequal opportunities. Since progressivity is designed to smooth out unequal opportuni-
ties, the redistributive tax should apply even where the taxpayer decides to pass on excess resources 
(likely attributable to excess opportunities) to others. In other words, others with less equal opportunities 
do not even have such a choice. 
Finally, even if one rejects the view that the transfers are a form of consumption, their treatment as 
such might be a reasonable compromise. One critique of the cash flow approach has been that it fails to 
take into account "availability of choice" by waiting to tax until consumption. See Fried, supra note 60, 
at 963 n.7. Taxing transfers might, therefore, be viewed as a compromise (i.e., while the system declines 
to tax control over assets while retained, tax would be imposed upon ultimate exercise of control through 
direct consumption or transfer). 
91. For instance, under the equality of opportunity theory, a wealth transferee receives an unequal 
excess opportunity. Similarly, under the view that a consumption tax burdens endowments, a recipient 
arguably should be taxed on wealth transfers too. By generally avoiding the income tax's potential 
"double" tax on saved wages (on wages and investment return), the consumption tax should weaken an 
objection that taxing both transferor and transferee imposes too many levels of tax. Transferees could be 
taxed only when the transferred funds were used for consumption. Multiple taxation of wealth transfers 
implicates some of the current wealth transfer tax difficulties such as (i) distinguishing support payments 
from wealth transfers and (ii) the appropriate treatment of generation-skipping transfers. See Charles 0. 
Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991). The merits of the hybrid 
approach, however, can be considered independent of the issue of multiple wealth transfer taxation. 
Assuming that the transferor reported the transferred property as consumption under the hybrid ap-
proach, double taxation could be avoided by, inter alia, increasing the transferee's basis offset account 
by the transferred property's value. See also infra note 186 (offering an alternative treatment of wealth 
transfers.) Thus, an analysis of the difficulties in subjecting wealth transfers to multiple taxation, and 
potential responses, is beyond the scope of this Article. (Note that multiple taxation can be imposed on 
wealth transfers under current law since, inter alia, the transferor might have paid income tax on the 
original invested funds). 
92. As discussed infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text, some debt might be treated as "tax 
prepaid." This, by itself, would allow some self-help averaging under the cash flow tax, since consump-
tion funded by tax prepaid debt would be taxed upon debt repayment and not actual consumption. This is 
an unsatisfactory response to the stated problem since tax prepaid debt treatment more generally allows 
tax deferral, thereby exacerbating the tax collection concerns discussed in Subpart IV .B. As discussed 
therein, the availability of tax prepaid debt treatment likely would be quite limited. 
Another suggested approach would allow taxpayers to "prepay" the tax on investment returns when 
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Full-scale averaging provisions, however, would likely be contentious, 
complex, and imprecise.93 Averaging provisions covering only several years 
would provide only a partial response for long-term savings.94 The hybrid 
approach's built-in response compares favorably: all previously taxed 
wages plus the risk-free return would be exempt from the tax base, even if 
saved years ago.95 
Additional progressivity problems under the cash flow tax arise in the 
other direction as well. Savings from high-wage years, which level con-
sumption, would decrease the tax burden.96 While there might be some sup-
port for a savings incentive,97 the cash flow tax again compromises the sav-
ings neutrality argument in favor of a consumption tax.98 Someone receiv-
ing high wages over a short time could minimize the progressivity impact 
by significantly extending the consumption period. In particular, the imposi-
the investment is made by declining the usual investment deduction. In return, the investment proceeds 
on such investments would be excluded. Thus taxpayers would have a choice to pay the tax at the in-
vestment year rate. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 119-27. This approach has been criticized for allow-
ing tax avoidance possibilities. Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1598-1610 (1979). In addition, it is unlikely to generate a consensus since it fails 
to collect tax in accordance with actual outcomes. Cf. infra note 157 and accompanying text (regarding 
wage tax shortcomings). 
93. Cf. MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 261-62 (9th ed. 2002) (former income 
averaging provisions "proved rather complex in operation" and "not clear that the eligibility require-
ments always succeeded in confining benefits [to the intended beneficiaries]"). Determining the period 
of time over which the taxpayer could average highlights some of these issues. A shorter period denies a 
full response to someone saving wages for an extended time period. A longer averaging period enhances 
administrative concerns. In addition, a longer period increases the chances that benefits would extend 
beyond the intended scope. Cf. id. ("[B]eneficiaries of income-averaging sometimes turned out to be 
taxpayers who had enjoyed a sudden but sustained increase in earnings."). Compare also Richard 
Schmalbeck, Income Averaging after Twenty Years: a Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 
DUKE L.J 509 (arguing that equity arguments in favor of income averaging are insubstantial) with M. 
Carr Ferguson & Edwin T. Hood, Income Averaging, 24 TAX L. REv. 53, 92 (1968) (construing income 
averaging provisions to require balance equity appeal against administrative complexities). 
94. For a proposal suggesting averaging over several years for the more general concern of heavy 
consumption within a year, see for example, Andrews, supra note 70, at 1157. See also Zelenak, supra 
note 84, at 222 (discussing more general income averaging for "a period of a few years"). But see WHAT 
SHOULD BET AXED: INCOME OR CONSUMPTION 318-19 (Pechman ed. 1980) ("[G]ifts and bequests could 
be taxed under the [cash flow] tax itself only if some sort of averaging were provided."); Alvin C. War-
ren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 
945 (1975) (stating that savers could face a tax burden due to additional receipts equal to the investment 
return, even assuming perfect lifetime averaging). 
95. Some progressivity concerns might remain where the taxpayer has significant risky returns. The 
hybrid approach, however, significantly reduces such concerns relative to the cash flow tax. See discus-
sion infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
96. Saved wages could face lower rates if shifted to a low consumption year. See Warren, supra 
note 94, at 945 n.53 for potential unfairness to someone preferring current consumption from high 
wages. The extra taxable investment receipts might reduce the potential savings benefit. See discussion 
supra note 94. Benefits would not accrue to the extent the shifting involved amounts in the middle of 
rate brackets. See Zelenak, supra note 84, at 222. 
97. See Zelenak, supra note 84, at 222. There would be a tax incentive to save wages from high 
earning years for consumption in lower wage years. 
98. See Warren, supra note 94, at 945 (offering that the strongest argument for consumption tax has 
been compromised due to Joss of savings neutrality in both directions). 
Imposing progressivity only on consumption also raises a related progressivity enforcement point. 
By removing progressivity on wages, the cash flow system places greater reliance on successfully block-
ing attempts by high-bracket consumers (for example, parents) to shift consumption to lower-bracket 
consumers (for example, children). 
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tion of progressivity on high wages themselves, even if saved, generates a 
fair degree of support.99 Furthermore, this uncapped opportunity to avoid 
progressivity on high wages might trouble even those favoring a more lim-
ited savings incentive. 100 
The hybrid approach's current tax on saved wages responds to this pro-
gressivity impact as well.101 Furthermore, in favorable contrast to the unlim-
ited ability to minimize progressivity under the cash flow tax, the hybrid 
approach could provide a more carefully circumscribed allowance. For in-
stance, like current law, a limited amount of wages saved for retirement 
could receive cash flow treatment (i.e., taxed only when withdrawn for con-
sumption in retirement).102 Finally, also in favorable contrast to the cash 
flow tax, a legislative tax rate change generally would not impact saved 
wages or the risk-free return thereon under the hybrid approach.103 
fu sum, the hybrid approach' s progressivity neutrality on saved wages 
and the risk-free return is a positive tradeoff for a potential progressivity 
problem of its own. Taxing wages upon receipt under a progressive rate 
structure causes variance in tax burdens based on the timing of the wages. 
This highlights the unavoidable tradeoff between savings shifts and wage 
timing variance.104 Unlike the cash flow tax, the hybrid approach favorably 
follows the current resolution: rejecting savings shifts in favor of wage-
based shifts.105 
99. Progressivity on high wages might be justified under an equality of opportunity theory of dis-
tributive justice; i.e., taxation should reduce pretax unequal opportunities. As wages increase, especially 
to really high levels, it arguably becomes increasingly more likely that unequal birth endowments and/or 
sheer luck played a significant role (for example, an athlete or entertainer). See Rakowski, supra note 60. 
Such high wages might, of course, be attributable to efforts devoted over a significant time frame ( de-
veloping invention, medical school, athlete/entertainer spending years honing skills etc.). See Zelenak, 
supra note 84, at 226-27 (noting possibility that persons with equal opportunities might have different 
wage earning patterns). For prior proposals suggesting a progressive wage tax ( coupled with a flat rate 
business tax), see BRADFORD, supra note 22, at 329-34; David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption 
Taxes and Who Pays Them, 39 TAX NOTES 383, 384-85 (1988); and CHARLES MCLURE & GEORGE 
ZODROW, A HYBRID APPROACH TO THE DIRECT TAXATION OF CONSUMPTION, 1N FRONTIERS OF TAX 
REFORM 70, 72 (Boskin ed., 1996). Additional supporters of progressivity on wages include those favor-
ing a progressive income tax in theory. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-
All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998). 
100. Under current law, taxpayers who save in qualified retirement plans can avoid progressivity on 
wages in high wage years. This ability to avoid the current progressivity burden is limited. First, there 
are caps on the amount of wages qualifying for such tax deferral treatment. See infra note 102. In addi-
tion, there are limits on the use of the saved amounts (e.g., for retirement). A pure cash flow tax would 
remove such amount and uses limitations. 
101. As discussed at Subpart II.C, the wages themselves would be taxed. Compare the wage tax's 
neutrality on savings decisions at Subpart IV.D.1. 
102. Such limits could be based on the current law limits. See, e.g.,§ I.R.C. 219 (2003) (dollar limita-
tions on deductible contributions to individual retirement accounts); id. § 415 (dollar limitations on 
contributions to qualified retirement plans). 
103. Under the cash flow tax, rate increases could harm savers while tax rate decreases could benefit 
savers. For an attempt to justify such impact under the cash flow tax, see Andrews, supra note 70. 
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (arguing that the case for progressivity on all wages is 
mixed). 
105. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50 (As a threshold matter this is a transitional advantage of the 
hybrid approach over the cash flow tax, since it avoids opening up the contentious progressivity tradeoff 
issue.). At the substantive level, someone favoring a consumption tax for its implicit savings exemption 
should be more accepting of the potential wage tax shortcomings. See Warren, supra note 94, at 945 
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B. Collection and Tax Avoidance Issues 
The cash flow tax's failure to tax saved wages raises tax avoidance and 
evasion issues. Currently, an employer must report wages to the IRS and 
withhold taxes from an employee's paycheck. This provides tax evasion 
protection.106 Wage withholding and information reporting would be inap-
plicable, or ineffective, under the cash flow tax to the extent of an em-
ployee's saved wages. 107 Shifting to the cash flow tax, therefore, would in-
crease the pressure on tax collections from savings/investment withdraw-
als. 108 Even assuming the system could adapt to such increased pressure, 
(noting that the progressivity impact under a progressive cash flow tax undercuts the strongest argument 
in favor of consumption taxation; in contrast, a graduated wage tax avoids this objection). In theory, 
similar issues arise under both the income tax and the wage tax. One might also favor high progressivity 
based on wages despite potential inequities in certain circumstances. See discussion supra note 99. 
Furthermore, the removal of progressivity on wages under the cash flow tax exacerbates concerns that 
taxpayers might minimize the progressivity impact by transferring assets. to lower-bracket family mem-
bers. Due to under valuation reporting issues, this could result even if wealth transfers were treated as 
consumption to the transferor. See discussion supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. Finally, the 
hybrid approach has flexibility to resolve the tradeoff differently if a consensus ultimately forms in favor 
of accepting the savings shifts over the wage shifts. See discussion irifra note 197. 
Depending on one's view as to when wage variance raises fairness issues, tax avoidance concerns 
can arise regarding taxpayer attempts to defer wage receipts from the year of performance to lower rate 
years. As the same issue arises under current law, current doctrines like constructive receipt, economic 
benefit, and cash equivalence provide some protection. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at § 11.01. In 
addition, there might be practical impediments to the wage deferral strategy. See discussion infra note 
135. Taxing wages on the accrual method also could be considered. 
106. Information reporting highlights the presence of taxable receipts. Wage withholding supple-
ments the information reporting; thus, the system no longer relies solely on the payment of the correct 
tax by the employees themselves. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Warns to Businesses on Tax Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at Cl (noting that no taxes collected when businesses stop withholding). 
While wage withholding is not foolproof; for instance, employees can overstate exemptions; it nonethe-
less provides another layer of protection. 
107. While withholding technically could be required, such withholdings would be refundable given 
the lack of underlying tax liability. Similarly, the information reporting would no longer highlight for the 
IRS the correct tax inclusion time on saved wages. A slight tiering problem would arise in fully negating 
the withholding tax where the tax rate is expressed on a tax-inclusive basis. Assume Tis paid $1000 
wages on 12/31/01 and a tax-inclusive rate of forty percent. The employer withholds $400. T invests the 
remaining $600 in 01, leaving a final 01 tax base of $400. T receives back only $240 of the $400 with-
held. ($400 less $160 tax liability on final 01 tax base.) Investing the $240 refund generates a $96 refund 
(.4 x $240) in 02, and so on. Although T ultimately receives back the full $400 withheld, there is a tim-
ing detriment (as $160 is received in later years). T receives back the $400 in 01 under an equivalent 66 
2/3% tax exclusive rate (since taxes are deductible when withheld in 01). See Graetz, supra note 92, at 
1582-84 (illustrating the converse point on under withholding). 
108. See, e.g., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 316-17 (prob-
lems on monitoring, especially since withdrawn sales proceeds fully taxable. under cash flow tax); Mi-
chael J. McIntyre, Commentary: The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade Alliance, 
49 TAX L. REV. 769, n.14 (1994) (stating that "a good percentage of saved income would escape taxa-
tion entirely" partly due to tax evasion); Richard Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731, 
734 (1996) (the necessary monitoring of financial transactions "will not be easy"). Withholding on 
savings withdrawals is unlikely to provide equivalent withholding protection due to, inter alia, the diffi-
culty in determining the taxpayer's overall tax bracket on each savings withdrawal. See Graetz, supra 
note 92, at 1596 ("[W]ithholding on expenditure tax receipts other than wages does not seem practi-
cal."). In particular, a taxpayer might have low withdrawals from different accounts with different with-
holding agents. In contrast, wages tend to be received from a limited number of sources, typically pro-
viding sufficient progressivity information to the withholding agent. Withholding at a low rate would 
provide only partial protection. In addition, over withholding still could result where the taxpayer has 
transition basis deductions. Furthermore, full protection would require withholding on a broad range of 
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expatriation concerns would remain. In particular, U.S. taxpayers emigrat-
ing with savings might avoid all U.S. tax on saved wages. 109 
Additional concerns might arise due to the likely special treatment of 
home acquisition indebtedness. Contrary to the cash flow rules for regular 
debt, (i) the proceeds from such "exempt" debt likely would be excluded 
from the tax base, while (ii) repayments of such exempt debt would be non-
deductible. 110 Such exempt treatment responds to the extreme progressivity 
"bunching" concerns on home purchases. 
The bunching concern follows from the special issues presented by con-
sumer durables. Under the cash flow tax, investments, but not current-
consumption assets, should be deductible. Consumer durables, like a home 
or car, are purchased partly for both purposes. The theoretic ideal-current 
deduction for the asset's purchase price and annual inclusion of each year's 
consumption element-raises administrative difficulties. Therefore, for 
practical reasons, commentary on the cash flow tax typically suggests 
eliminating both the deduction and the annual inclusions. On a present value 
basis, the tax cost of the denied current deduction approximates the elimina-
tion of the subsequent inclusions. 111 
transactions, such as real estate sales, and leasing arrangements. Similarly, effective information report-
ing would require reporting of all such financial transactions. 
109. Concern arises since savings withdrawals would occur when the taxpayer was outside the 
United States taxing regime. The seriousness of this problem has been debated. See WHAT SHOULD BE 
TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 323 (emigration "acknowledged to be extremely 
troublesome"); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Comments on Grubert & Newlon, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 259,261 (1996) 
(downplaying significance); Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Con-
sumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619, 640 (1995) (noting emigration and vacationing abroad 
problems); Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Reply to Avi-Yonah, 49 NAT'L TAX JOURNAL 267, 267 
(1996) (noting the foreign consumption problem); McIntyre, supra note 108, at 769 n.14 (stating that "a 
good percentage of saved income would escape taxation entirely" partly due to expatriation). An expa-
triation tax would not be as effective as an initial wage tax. A comparable problem exists under current 
law when taxpayers expatriate holding appreciated assets. The cash flow tax exacerbates the problem 
since the entire value, not just gain, should be taxed. The current expatriation tax reportedly is virtually 
unenforceable. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International 
Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1338 (1996); Graetz, supra note 92, at 1648 (noting lack of 
easy response to expatriation issue). 
110. For administrative reasons, relatively low levels of consumer indebtedness also might receive 
this special treatment. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1618-20. 
Treating consumer debt under the exempt debt regime also protects the government against a tax 
avoidance possibility where consumer goods are purchased on credit. Where consumer debt is treated 
under the normal cash flow rules, the purchaser's tax liability would be decreased where the interest 
component of the deferred payment was overstated (with a corresponding understatement of the pur-
chase price of the good). A comparable problem arises under the current income tax, as well, since the 
seller of a capital asset has an incentive to understate the interest component of a deferred payment (so 
that some of the interest would qualify for capital gains rates and possibly deferral). See I.RC. § 1274 
(2003) (providing a partial response for covered transactions). 
111. See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 121-22; Graetz, supra note 92, at 1614-15. In addition, 
some prior commentary has also suggested including in the tax base the receipt of sales proceeds/rent in 
excess of the original purchase price. Losses, however, would not be allowed. See, e.g., Graetz, supra 
note 92, at 1616-18; Zodrow & McLure, supra note 44, at 468-69. 
Nondeductible purchase price plus gain inclusion might raise concerns that such "double tax" re-
stores the income tax's incentive to consume rather than save (i.e., current consumption avoids the 
double tax). In response, however, the nondeductible/gain inclusion rule would apply to a much more 
narrow universe of assets under the hybrid approach. Furthermore, taxpayers are compensated for the 
nondeductible purchase price by the exclusion of the actual consumption element each year. The present 
1228 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 54:4:1205 
While this approach addresses the administrative concerns, the entire 
purchase price of a home would be taxed in the acquisition year if the mort-
gage amount were treated under the normal cash flow rules.112 The exempt 
debt treatment responds to this concern by limiting the current year's inclu-
sion to the down payment.113 Exempt debt, however, would allow current 
tax avoidance where the debt proceeds finance, in substance, the acquisition 
of deductible savings assets. 11 
Such concerns should be less threatening than the income tax shortcom-
ings discussed in Subpart 11.B for two reasons. First, a future tax liability 
with an equivalent present value generally would arise. 115 Second, the nar-
row circumstances in which the consumption tax concerns arise favorably 
contrast with the more general avoidance possibilities under the income 
tax. 116 Special tax avoidance rules (for example, loss of exempt debt treat-
ment in abusive situations) would further reduce concerns. 117 Nonetheless, 
the ability to defer ~aying taxes, until after consumption, exacerbates the 
collection concerns. 1 8 
value equivalency of the purchase price and subsequent consumption use generally eliminates the time 
value of money concerns that exist under the current structure. In addition, the income tax has its own 
imprecision on consumer durables. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 74-76 for a more detailed 
discussion of consumer durables, including why the imperfections under the consumption tax do not 
favor retention of the income tax. 
112. Assume T purchases a $500,000 home in 01 using (i) $100,000 savings for the down payment 
and (ii) a $400,000 loan. Treating the loan under the normal cash flow rules would increase T's 2001 tax 
base by $500,000 ($100,000 dissaving plus $400,000 loan proceeds included under cash flow approach). 
"Bunching" the home's lifetime of deferred consumption into a single year unjustly subjects T to greater 
progressivity (liquidity concerns also might arise as a portion of the borrowing would be needed to pay 
taxes). This rule would not eliminate bunching concerns attributable to the down payment. 
113. On the above example, the $400,000 loan proceeds would not be added to the 01 tax base. 
Instead, T would have additional inclusions as the mortgage (principal and interest) was repaid. See infra 
note 115 and accompanying text. 
114. Assume Towns an appreciated house free and clear of debt. T sells the house, purchasing an-
other house of equal value (for example, $1,000,000). T borrows eighty percent of the purchase price of 
the new house (for example, $800,000), thereby freeing up $800,000 of sales proceeds from the first 
house. T invests the $800,000; the resulting $800,000 savings deduction allows tax-free.consumption for 
the foreseeable future. For a comparable avoidance attempt under the USA tax, see Martin D. Ginsburg, 
Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax: Some Thoughts on Working, Saving, and Consuming In Nunn-
Domenici' s Tax World, 48 NAT'L TAXJ. 585,597 (1995) (containing "Sell Your Fine Home" example). 
Forcing T to recognize gain on the sale of the home would block this scheme. It is likely, however, that 
some, or all, of the gain would be excluded from the tax base. As discussed supra at note 111, consumer 
durable gain generally would be included. Nonetheless, consistent with current law some gain on the 
sale of a home might be excluded regardless of whether a new home is purchased. See I.R.C. § 121 
(2003). Alternatively, such gain might be excluded under a rollover rule to the extent T purchases a new 
home of equal or greater value. See the rollover rule in the proposed USA tax, discussed in Ginsburg, 
supra, at 597. 
115. While the principal would be excluded on receipt, taxpayers would lose later deductions on the 
payment of both principal and interest for exempt debt. The taxpayer would have a net inclusion at such 
time since the funds used to repay such debt would be included in the base. 
116. Also note that the current income tax's special tax treatment of home indebtedness raises tax 
avoidance possibilities as well. Current deductibility of home interest (subject to limits) allows tax 
avoidance possibilities when such debt funds the acquisition of capital assets. See Engler, supra note 42, 
at 93-94. 
117. See discussion supra note 114. Separately, anti-avoidance rules would be needed to block at-
tempts to report consumer durables as investment assets (to obtain a current deduction). 
118. Additional concern might arise that T could "default" on the tax liability. Even if T repays the 
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The hybrid approach responds to these collection concerns. First, the 
hybrid approach responds to the general tax avoidance and evasion concerns 
by maintaining tax collections on saved wages at the wage date. Second, the 
prohibition against offsetting wages with new savings deductions also pro-
tects against the specific concern on exempt debt. 119 Thus, residual tax col-
lection concerns under the hybrid approach's adjusted cash flow component 
would be reduced relative to the cash flow tax. The hybrid approach would 
tax savings withdrawals for consumption only to the extent such amounts 
exceeded saved wages plus the risk-free rate of return. 120 In addition, the 
concerns under the hybrid approach would be more comparable to current 
law; i.e., investment gains generate tax liabilities under an income tax 
base.121 
C. Transition/Revenue Concerns 
The primary transition issue under the cash flow tax involves post-shift 
consumption funded from receipts saved and taxed under the prior income 
tax (wages, for example).122 Including withdrawals of such savings in the 
tax base, as under the normal cash flow rules, would result in an unfair dou-
ble tax. 123 This potential double tax should be corrected.124 Specifically ex-
third-party lender, T would need additional resources to pay tax on the funds used to repay the debt. 
Limiting the amount of exempt debt provides a significant response. (Treating debt under the regular 
cash flow rules eliminates this concern since no tax liability arises on receipts used to repay such de-
ductible debt.) Also, a broader default concern exists under the realization income tax. As discussed in 
Subpart II.B, a taxpayer holding offsetting gain and loss investments could selectively sell only the 
losing investment, with such loss offsetting otherwise taxable consumption. While the sale of the gain 
investment would trigger a later tax liability, a third party lender could have a prior claim to the sales 
proceeds. See Knoll, supra note 46. Thus, the default possibility exists under the income tax whenever 
sales proceeds are needed to repay third party debt. In contrast, the potential arises only on exempt debt 
under the cash flow tax. Also recall how T benefited under the income tax even absent the extreme 
insolvency scenario contemplated here with the interest-free deferral benefit. Separately, T might default 
on the underlying third party debt. While taxing debt forgiveness would preserve the government's tax 
claim, T might lack the resources to pay such tax. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1609. This is also present 
under the income tax, however, and limiting exempt debt should lessen the issue relative to the income 
tax. 
119. An alternative understanding of the additional protection recognizes that the concern regards tax 
collections on savings withdrawals. The hybrid approach relies relatively less on collections from sav-
ings withdrawals due to its strengthened wage tax (and corresponding basis offset account). 
120. Cf WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 316 (discussing the 
concern that cash flow tax raises greater collection concerns than the income tax since the entire pro-
ceeds would be taxable under the cash flow tax). Note that the full proceeds would not be taxable under 
the cash flow tax to the extent the taxpayer had usable transition deductions. 
121. Additional concern might arise under the hybrid approach that taxpayers could avoid the wage 
tax protection by "converting" wages to investment income (and then offsetting the converted invest-
ment income through the phantom savings deductions). This does not favor the income tax over the 
hybrid approach, however, since a conversion transaction under current law similarly removes the wage 
tax protection. See discussion supra note 42. Thus, the wage tax protection under the hybrid approach is 
comparable to the current law protection; i.e., both have an extra level of protection vis-a-vis the cash 
flow tax. Similarly, under the hybrid approach, the incentive to shift wages from a high salary to a low 
salary year is present under current law. See discussion supra note 105. 
122. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, for a more in-depth analysis of how the hybrid approach 
greatly simplifies the transition to a consumption tax. 
123. Assume the cash flow tax replaces the income tax in year 02 and a flat forty percent rate. T pays 
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empting consumption funded from already-taxed savings raises tracing dif-
ficulties.125 To avoid such administrative problems, taxpayers could be al-
lowed "transition" deductions, usable against all consumption, equal to the 
aggregate tax basis of savings assets held at transition.126 This approach 
raises revenue concerns, however, since a taxpayer would pay no tax until 
the exhaustion of all transition and new savings deductions. 127 The possible 
solution of issuing explicit government debt in the intervening years128 
raises political concerns.129 
$400 income tax on $1,000 wages received on 12/31/01. T saves the remaining $600, withdrawing it for 
consumption on 1/01/02. Since savings withdrawals increase the new base, T pays additional tax of $240 
($600 x 40%) in year 02, for total taxes of $640 on $1000 wages. 
124. There is a general consensus for transition relief from this problem, which is attributable to the 
government's shift in the timing for inclusion of saved wages. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES 
CHANGE, 183-87 (2000); Avishai Shachar, The Importance of Considering Liabilities in Tax Transitions, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1842 (1985). For a thoughtful analysis providing the alternate view, see Joseph 
Bankman, The Engler-Knoll Consumption Tax Proposal: What Transition Rule Does Fairness (or Poli-
tics) Require, 56 SMU L. REV. 83 (2003). Other transition issues include the continuation of preferences 
like the current exclusion of state and local bond interest (since the preference might have reduced the 
pretax interest rate). The merits of transition relief for such preferences, however, are far less certain than 
the textual double tax issue. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 509,607 (1986); Shachar, supra; Shaviro, supra at 181-82. But see Graetz, supra note 92, at 1649-
53; see also Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 69-70 n.85 (noting how the hybrid approach has flexibil-
ity to provide special relief on these issues as well, if needed for a political consensus). 
125. Specific tracking rules also might encourage taxpayers to fund consumption from assets in 
which they have a relatively high purchase price. 
126. Tax basis on purchased assets equals the purchase price less the tax depreciation, if any. Unus-
able deductions could be carried forward to subsequent years, possibly with an interest increase. See 
infra note 131 for the appropriateness of an interest adjustment in a comparable context. Allowing transi-
tion deductions for all basis arguably is overbroad. For instance, under I.RC. § 1014 (2003), recipients 
receive a basis equal to an asset's value at the time of a bequest even though no income taxes have been 
paid on any appreciation (although some estate tax may have been paid). Distinguishing "taxed" basis 
from "tax-free" basis raises complexity concerns. 
127. See Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482 
(1995) (noting "substantial revenue shortfall during the early years"); see also Graetz, supra note 92, at 
1654 (wealthy could pay no tax indefinitely); George Mundstock, Comment: What's on Second, 51 U. 
MIAMI L. REV., 1079, 1081 (1997) (noting revenue loss if investments currently deductible); accord 
DAVID BRADFORD, CONSUMPI'ION TAX: SOME FuNDAMENTAL 'TRANSITION ISSUES, IN FRONTIERS OF 
TAX REFORM at 142 (Hoskin ed. 1996). Additional concern might arise that taxpayers would resolve 
ambiguities about actual tax basis at the time of transition in their favor (e.g., stock purchased years 
earlier). See Alliance USA, supra. While basis uncertainty is a problem under current law, the suggested 
cash flow transition approach would allow such overstated basis to offset all income. Compare favorably 
the hybrid approach. 
128. If interest were provided on deferred transition deductions, see discussion supra note 131, the 
government's cost is comparable. E.g., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR CONSUMPTION, supra 
note 94, at 310 (noting that government could alter its explicit borrowing). 
129. See Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a Consumption Tax: The USA Tax 
System, 95 TAX NOTES 171-47 (Aug. 31, 1995) (increasing conventional government debt would not be 
politically feasible). Compare Daniel Altman, Accounts Chock-Full or a Plan Half-Empty?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2003, at Cl (stating that the Bush proposal allows conversions of traditional IRAs to tax-exempt 
accounts in order to "shift revenue from the future to now"). The wealthy also could avoid all tax for an 
extended time. See Shounak Sarkar & George R. Zodrow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct 
Consumption Tax, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 363 (1993) (in context of a business consumption tax, noting 
the problem of certain businesses paying no tax in the early years). A significant increase in explicit 
government debt also might raise non-tax concerns. Separately, allowing certain taxpayers to avoid all 
tax payments on all their consumption for an extended period raises the tax collection concerns dis-
cussed above. 
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A prior legislative proposal therefore allowed transition deductions to 
offset only consumption funded from savings assets. 130 This approach is 
theoretically sound since the transition deductions correspond to savings 
assets. 131 Prior commentary showed, however, that sophisticated taxpayers 
could avoid such limit merely by deferring the receipt of wages by one 
year. 132 In addition, overall revenue concerns might remain given the lack of 
tax collections on (i) post-transition saved wages (due to new savings de-
ductions) and (ii) much post-transition consumption (due to transition de-
ductions).133 
The wage component of the hybrid approach once again responds to 
these concerns. The hybrid approach more naturally would restrict the use 
of transition deductions to savings-funded consumption. For instance, tran-
sition deductions could be added to the regular basis offset account.134 Fur-
thermore, deferring the receipt of salary until the next year would not mean-
ingfully circumvent this desired restriction. Such one-year deferral would 
130. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995) (sponsored by Sens. Nunn, Kerrey, and 
Domenici). The USA approach had an additional limitation in that transition assets needed to be sold to 
free up the transition basis. This limitation would not be meaningful in practice. See Ginsburg, supra 
note 114, at 596. 
131. Thus, an alternative suggestion raises other concerns. Each year's usable transition deductions 
could be limited to a fixed percentage of the overall amount; unused amounts could be carried forward 
with interest. Kaplow, supra note 129. The interest addresses concerns that accelerating taxes (by defer-
ring deductions) increases the taxpayer's cost under time value of money principles. Transition basis 
should be reduced by the taxpayer's liabilities ( other than debt exempt from cash flow treatment. For 
possible exempt debt, see notes 110-13 and accompanying text). Tax still would not be paid, however, 
on either (i) saved wages, due to unlimited new savings deductions or (ii) significant consumption ( due 
to the partial allowance of the transition deductions). While a low percentage allowance would minimize 
revenue losses, the likelihood of double taxation increases where significant transition savings are spent 
in early post-shift years. Taxpayers would benefit from the carry forward of unused transition deductions 
only if they generated enough subsequent consumption through new wages or extraordinary investment 
returns on their remaining savings. Compare a similar, but more limited possibility of unusable basis 
under the hybrid approach at supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. The hybrid approach has 
several advantages over the other alternative including: (i) full allowance of transition basis against 
consumption funded from savings, (ii) tax collections on saved wages, and (iii) responsiveness to the 
other concerns raised under the cash flow tax. 
132. Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 596. The strategy involves the following: taxpayers arrange to have 
their salary paid only in alternate odd-numbered years (deferring receipt of the even-year salary until the 
following odd year); savings assets are used to purchase consumption goods only in even years (but 
goods are consumed in even and odd years); transition deductions offset the consumption purchased 
from savings assets in the even years; salary paid in odd years replenishes the withdrawn savings assets; 
whereby the resulting new savings deductions avoid all tax on the salary. Additional tax-free consump-
tion in the odd years could be achieved by (i) purchasing a consumer durable asset in an even year and 
(ii) selling it in the odd year, using the proceeds to fund consumption. For the exclusion of consumer 
durable proceeds when sold for the original purchase price, see supra note 111. In sum, taxpayers would 
avoid tax on (i) the salary (since it was "saved") and (ii) all consumption (since it was funded from 
"savings"). 
133. Revenue would not be collected from (i) saved wages or (ii) significant consumption funded 
from savings (due to transition deductions). The problem is that taxes generally are collected on the 
"front-end" as wages are paid under current law (even if they are saved). Under the cash flow tax, taxing 
savings withdrawals on the "back-end" compensates for the revenue loss from savers on the front-end. 
Revenue is not collected from either group, however, if the shift to the back-end cash flow tax contains 
appropriate transition relief for asset holders, the future dissaving population. This revenue loss is most 
pronounced in the early years of the interim transition period since tax collections from dissavers ( once 
transition deductions are used up) eventually will offset the revenue loss from savers. 
134. Recall that the basis offset account is usable only against non-wage consumption. 
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merely defer the tax payment until the following year, in favorable contrast 
to the long-term deferral concern expressed under the cash flow tax.135 The 
hybrid approach also generates revenue on saved wages. 136 The stronger 
wage tax base facilitates appropriate transition relief (i.e., free deductibility 
of all transition basis against consumption funded from savings). 137 
135. A comparable strategy under the hybrid approach would require a more difficult, prolonged 
deferral of salary. Under such prolonged deferral strategy, the taxpayer would fund consumption from 
savings withdrawals, using transition deductions to avoid tax. Interest on the deferred salary would 
provide an investment return. This indefinite salary deferral, however, is less likely to be acceptable to 
taxpayers from a non-tax perspective than the one-year deferral strategy under the cash flow tax. First, 
taxpayers would have to bear their employer's credit risk for an extended period of time. (Under current 
law, taxpayers generally can avoid current tax on deferred salary only if the employer's promise to pay is 
unfunded and unsecured.) Second, converting their assets to deferred rights against their employer might 
limit their investment opportunities on such long-term "savings assets." In contrast, the one-year deferral 
strategy under the cash flow tax requires a deferral of one year or less (until January I of the next year). 
In any event, if thought problematic, a rule could limit the deferral of "earned but unpaid" wages ( even if 
an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay). See discussion supra note 105 (regarding potential accrual 
system on wages). A similar rule for the one-year deferral year problem under the cash flow tax would 
need a precise allocation of salary to the correct year in order to be effective. In contrast, such precision 
is not necessary under the hybrid approach (where the concern is to prevent unlimited deferral). (Precise 
income allocation, however, might be desirable for reasons of rate progressivity. See discussion supra 
note 105.) 
136. This responds to the overall revenue loss concern under the cash flow tax during transition ( due 
to the lack of collections from savers and some consumers). See discussion supra note 133 and accom-
panying text. 
A separate revenue point concerns the corporate tax. The corporate-level tax arguably lacks theo-
retic justification once shareholders are taxed on consumption under the cash flow tax or the hybrid 
approach. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1634-42 (raising this point in the context of the cash flow tax). 
Shifting to a consumption tax at the individual level therefore might raise revenue concerns if such move 
required the elimination of the corporate tax. In response, however, similar theoretic objections have 
been raised regarding the corporate tax under the current "income" tax structure. See, e.g., Colloquium 
on Corporate Integration, 47 TAX L. REv. 427 (1992). A possible argument that the corporate tax substi-
tutes for the failure to tax shareholders currently on their share of corporate income fails to withstand 
close scrutiny. The current corporate and income tax regime has a weak correlation to a current tax on 
each shareholder ( on their share of corporate income). In addition to the different rates faced by different 
shareholders, consider, for instance, a corporation that pays out most of its earnings as dividends. This 
presents the classic double taxation scenario as the corporate-level tax is imposed on top of a current 
shareholder tax on the dividends.) Thus, corporate tax revenues do not favor the retention of the income 
tax over a consumption tax. That is, a theoretically questionable corporate tax could be maintained in 
conjunction with either an individual-level income or consumption tax. 
137. Compare the criticism of the USA bill's compromise due to revenue concerns. See Kaplow, 
supra note 129; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Savings Allowance," 68 TAX 
NOTES 1103 (1995). Recall also the concern that taxpayers might overstate allowable deductions. Con-
cern is reduced when the deductions cannot shelter new wages. 
Denying transition relief might impose an efficient one-time tax on existing savings. The transition 
double tax arguably is efficient since taxpayers holding previously taxed savings at transition generally 
cannot change their behavior to avoid such excess tax (taxpayers with knowledge of an impending 
consumption tax could avoid the tax, but only by using their savings to consume before the effective 
date). In fact, it has been argued that this potential double tax provides most of the efficiency gains from 
a shift to a consumption tax. See ALAN AUERBACH, Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and 
Growth, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FuNDAMENT ALT AX REFORM 31 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale 
eds., 1996). 
Notwithstanding the loss of an efficient one-time wealth tax, many proponents of a consumption tax 
favor transition relief for existing basis. E.g., FuNDAMENTAL TRANSITION ISSUES, supra note 127, at 
144-47; see also Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 129, at 363 (while efficiency suggests revenue benefits to 
denying transition relief, lack of transition relief has cost of offsetting expectations regarding future tax 
policy); see supra note 124. 
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This Subpart contrasts the treatment of risky returns under the hybrid 
approach and the cash flow tax. As discussed above, the consumption tax 
receives significant support from its implicit exemption of investment re-
turn. Therefore, this risky return analysis also compares the hybrid approach 
to a stand-alone wage tax, under which earned wages face current tax with 
an explicit exemption for all investment return. Subpart IV.D.1 analyzes the 
progressivity impact on risky returns. As shown therein, the hybrid ap-
proach imposes a desirable moderate progressivity burden on risky returns, 
whereas the cash flow and wage taxes take polar positions. Subpart IV.D.2 
then considers several other potential risky return burdens that are inde-
pendent of progressive rates. 
1. Progressive Rate Issues 
Subpart IV.A analyzed the cash flow tax's progressivity burden on 
saved wages and the risk-free return. 138 A progressive cash flow tax simi-
larly could burden risky returns. This is especially possible since the cash 
flow base includes the original investment amount, the risk-free return, and 
the risky premium when savings are withdrawn for consumption. 139 At the 
other end of the spectrum, the wage tax's direct exemption of all investment 
return fails to impose any progressivity burden on risky returns, even where 
the risky returns materially enhance a taxpayer's lifestyle. The hybrid ap-
proach moderates by imposing a progressivity burden on risky premiums, 
but not on the other components. The following examples illustrate these 
principles. 
Example 7 assumes a flat tax rate to focus on the underlying structures 
of the three different taxes regarding risky returns. Example 8 then applies 
progressive rates to a risky return scenario. 
Example 7: Treceives a $100,000 cash salary on 12/31/01. T invests 
all (after-tax) wages in a risky stock that doubles in value as of 
12/31/02. T consumes all (after-tax) proceeds on 12/31/02. The tax 
rate is a flat fifty percent. 
Consider first the wage tax. T owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the 
wages. 140 T invests the remaining $50,000 of (after-tax) wages in the stock. 
138. This might arise because (i) the cash flow tax has extra tax base inclusions equal to the risk-free 
return on saved wages or (ii) saved wages can be consumed (including through wealth transfers) in 
relatively heavier consumption years. The saved wage amount is included earlier under the hybrid ap-
proach than the cash flow approach. This potential also could work in the other direction if wages are 
earned in a high wage-earning year and are consumed in a lower year. See discussion supra notes 96-101 
and accompanying text. 
139. Risky returns generally should increase the likelihood of the progressivity burden given the 
inclusion of extra amounts in the tax base. See Warren, supra note 94, at 945 n.53. 
140. 0.5 X $100,000. 
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The stock is sold one year later for $100,000. No further tax is owed given 
the direct exemption of all investment return. T's after-tax consumption is 
$100,000. 
Consider, next, the results under the cash flow tax. T owes no tax in 
year 01 since T saves everything (i.e., he consumes nothing). T invests the 
$100,000 of wages in the stock, selling the investment for $200,000 at the 
end of year 02. 141 The $200,000 proceeds are fully taxable since they will be 
consumed (not reinvested). T pays $100,000 tax, leaving $100,000 for con-
sumption.142 The equal results under the wage and consumption tax illus-
trate the cash flow tax's implicit exemption of investment return in certain 
circumstances. 143 
Finally, compare the hybrid approach. T owes $50,000 tax on the wages 
in year 01 even though he is saving. If T limited his stock investment to the 
remaining $50,000 of after-tax wages, T would have significantly less pro-
ceeds available for consumption than the $100,000 under the cash flow and 
wage taxes. This would occur since (i) the stock investment would be sold 
for $100,000, while (ii) the stock return in excess of the ten percent risk-free 
rate (i.e., $45,000 of the $50,000 gain) would be taxed under the adjusted 
cash flow component of the hybrid approach. 144 
A conceptual understanding of the cash flow tax's implicit risky return 
exemption highlights, however, that such significant decrease can be 
avoided under the hybrid approach.145 In contrast to the wage tax, the fifty 
percent cash flow tax required T to share half the stock gain with the gov-
ernment. T negated this formal tax collection, however, by doubling the 
risky stock investment from $50,000 (under the wage tax) to $100,000 un-
der the cash flow tax. While the consumption tax reduced T's after-tax 
profit share to fifty percent of the pretax gain (100% - 50% tax rate), dou-
bling the investment generated twice as much pretax gain.146 T similarly can 
141. This assumes that T's investment of $100,000, rather than $50,000, does not affect the pricing of 
the investment. The increased demand for risky assets relative to the wage tax, however, arguably would 
increase the purchase price of risky assets. The extent of such pricing change is uncertain, however, 
since investors not subject to the U.S. taxing regime (for example, foreigners, tax exempts) would not 
adjust their portfolios in response to the U.S. tax. Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxa-
tion of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). In addition, some U.S. tax-
payers will not increase their risky investments (relative to the wage tax). See discussion infra note 14 7. 
142. Tax= $200,000 x 0.5 = $100,000. Consumption= $200,000 - $100,000 tax. 
143. Equal results will not always occur. The most significant difference occurs under progressive 
rates. See discussion infra concerning Example 8; see also discussion infra note 147, for other reasons 
why the implicit exemption might fail. 
144. The risk-free return on the $50,000 investment would be only $5000 ($50,000 x 10%). Techni-
cally, the $100,000 stock proceeds would be included in the base; the deductible basis offset account 
would be only $55,000 ($50,000 x 1.1). 
145. This insight follows from the recent literature explaining why the income tax's excess theoretic 
burden, relative to the cash flow consumption tax, generally is imposed only on the risk-free rate of 
return. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 58; Cunningham, supra note 38; Warren, supra note 54; see 
also discussion supra concerning Example 5. The hybrid approach analysis differs from the income tax 
analysis, however, in that the hybrid approach provides an exemption for the risk-free rate of return 
(through the interest adjustment to the basis offset account). As discussed above, this exemption makes 
the hybrid approach a consumption tax equivalent. 
146. While a fifty percent tax rate was used for ease of exposition, the analysis remains true for other 
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negate the tax collection under the fifty percent hybrid tax by doubling his 
stock investment to $100,000.147 
While T has only $50,000 of after-tax wages under the hybrid approach, 
T nonetheless can increase his risky investment to $100,000 by borrowing 
or using other assets. in the first instance, assume T makes this portfolio 
adjustment by borrowing $50,000 at the ten percent risk-free rate. (Subpart 
IV.D.2 below discusses the possibility that T's borrowing rate would exceed 
the risk-free rate.) Like the cash flow tax, T sells the stock for $200,000. T 
owes the lender $55,000, including the $5,000 interest. T owes the govern-
ment $45,000 under the adjusted cash flow component of the hybrid tax: the 
fifty percent tax rate multiplied by the excess of (i) the $200,000 stock pro-
ceeds over (ii) total deductions of $110,000 ($55,000 debt repayment plus 
the $55,000 basis offset account).148 This leaves T with the same $100,000 
of after-tax consumption as under the wage and cash flow taxes. 149 
The following example reintroduces progressive rates into the analysis. 
This example demonstrates how the three taxes can reach very different 
results under a progressive rate system. 
Example 8: T receives a $100,000 salary on each of 12/31/01 and 
12/31/02. T invests all after-tax wages from 01 for one year in a 
very risky stock that quadruples in value as of one year later. The 
tax rate is fifty percent for amounts up to, and including, $100,000; 
additional amounts are taxed at a sixty percent rate. T consumes all 
available funds on 12/31/02. 
Under the stand-alone wage tax, T pays $50,000 tax in year 01 on the 
$100,000 of wages, leaving $50,000 for investment in the risky stock. T 
tax rates. More generally, in order to achieve the wage tax results, T should increase his risky stock 
investment under the cash flow tax by a multiplier equal to 1/(1 - tax rate). E.g., a fifty percent tax rate 
requires doubling the investment amount since 1/(1 - .5) = 2.0. 
147. Some taxpayers might fail to increase their portfolios in response to the tax, perhaps failing to 
understand the ramifications of the government's co-investment. Such taxpayers do not necessarily face 
an excess tax burden under the consumption taxes relative to the wage tax, however. For the same 
amount of investment, the taxpayer has a lower risk of loss since investment losses on risky assets re-
duce the tax payments under the consumption taxes, but not the wage tax. In effect, the government 
provides implicit insurance against the risk of loss. A similar point can be made about the income tax. 
See Chorvat; supra note 141; see also, Fried, supra note 60, at 988-89. This assumes that the loss is 
usable under the hybrid approach, the cash flow tax, and the income tax. The cash flow tax provides the 
greatest assurance in this regard since any loss will reduce the proceeds available for consumption, 
thereby reducing the tax bill. Compare the discussion of how the taxpayer might have unusable tax 
losses under the hybrid and/or income taxes at notes 172-79 and 205. In this sense, the cash flow tax has 
a comparative advantage since it allows for greater portfolio adjustments. On ihe other hand, greater 
portfolio adjustments might increase the purchase price of risky assets, imposing an implicit tax. See 
discussion supra note 141. Furthermore, even a partial ability to use losses reduces the risk on risky 
investments. 
148. Debt repayments generally are deductible under the cash flow component. See discussion supra 
note 10. The basis offset account equals the $50,000 saved wages plus the ten percent risk-free return 
thereon for one year. $50,000 x 1.1 = $55,000. Tax = 0.5 x [$200,000 - ($55,000 + $55,000)] = 0.5 x 
$90,000 = $45,000. 
149. $200,000 stock proceeds - ($55,000 debt repayment+ $45,000 taxes)= $100,000. 
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owes no tax when the stock is sold for $200,000 ($50,000 x 4). T pays 
$50,000 tax on the year 02 wages, generating additional after-tax funds of 
$50,000. T therefore has $250,000 available for consumption in year 02. 
Under the cash flow tax, T purchases $100,000 of stock on 12/31/01 
since no tax was owed at that time. T has $500,000 of pretax funds on 
12/31/02: (i) $100,000 of new wages plus (ii) $400,000 ($100,000 x 4) of 
stock sale proceeds. T owes $290,000 tax under the progressive rate struc-
ture, 150 leaving only $210,000 for consumption. 
Under the hybrid approach, T owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the 
wages. Similar to Example 7, T should increase his risky investment to 
$100,000. Therefore, assume again that T borrows $50,000 at the ten per-
cent risk-free rate. At the end of year 02, T has pretax funds of $445,000: 
the same $500,000 calculated under the cash flow tax less the $55,000 debt 
repayment. T owes tax of $224,000 of tax under the progressive rate struc-
ture, leaving $221,000 for consumption. 151 
To summarize the results, the wage tax left T with the most consump-
tion ($250,000). There was no progressivity burden since the wage tax ex-
cluded the entire investment return from its base. In sharp contrast, the cash 
flow tax left T with the least consumption ($210,000). The higher progres-
sive rate applied to the risky return, the saved wages, and the risk-free re-
tum.152 The hybrid approach left T with a moderate consumption amount 
($221,000); only the risky return was subject to the progressive rate. 153 
As discussed above, the consumption tax derives significant support 
from its perceived investment return exemption. The wage tax therefore 
might appear to have greater (consumption tax) consensus potential than 
either the cash flow or hybrid approaches. The wage tax, however, goes too 
far in its direct exemption of all investment return. Even those favoring a 
consumption tax in its own right, and not as a replacement for the flawed 
income tax, often do not rely solely on the implicit savings exemption. 
Separately, by ultimately collecting tax on all resources when consumed, a 
consumption tax arguably satisfies an "ability to pay" criteria.154 A related 
articulation focuses on the correlation between tax collections and the actual 
standard of living under a consumption tax. By ignoring all actual invest-
ment return, a wage tax can deviate significantly from these desires. Pro-
150. (0.5 X $100,000) + (0.6 X $400,000). 
151. Tax base= $390,000. {$100,000 wages+ [$400,000 - ($55,000 basis offset account+ $55,000 
debt repayment]). Tax= (.5 x $100,000) + (.6 x $290,000) = $224,000. 
152. The higher rate, by 10% (60% - 50%), applied to the $100,000 saved wages plus the entire 
$300,000 gain. 10% x $400,000 = $40,000 progressive burden. (There was additional consumption of 
$40,000 under the wage tax relative to the cash flow tax: $250,000 - $210,000.) 
153. The higher rate, by ten percent, applied only to the stock gain in excess of the risk-free rate 
($10,000 of the $300,000 stock gain correlates to the risk-free rate; $290,000 was the risky premium). $ 
290,000 x 10% = $29,000. (There was additional consumption of $29,000 under the wage tax relative to 
the cash flow tax: $250,000 - $221,000.) 
154. Ability to pay has been criticized for its theoretical imprecision; i.e., ability to pay is not self-
defining. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment, 53 TAX L. 
REV. 397, 399 (2000). Nonetheless, ability to pay continues to frame the debate and seems to require, at 
a minimum, that tax be collected on available resources at some particular time. 
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gressive rates enhance the objection. As demonstrated by Example 8, con-
sumption of extraordinary investment returns on modest wages would avoid 
all progressivity (consider also a lottery winner).155 Thus, even some favor-
ing a consumption tax in theory desire progressivity on risky returns. 156 
A wage tax would have an even more difficult time satisfying those 
supporting the consumption tax only as a replacement for the flawed income 
tax. Shifting the tax collection timing from realization to consumption is a 
relatively minor change for an income tax advocate, one more easily ac-
cepted in order to avoid the realization problems. In contrast, shifting to a 
system which completely ignores actual investment outcomes is a much 
more dramatic change. 157 
At the other end of the spectrum, the cash flow tax imposed a progres-
sivity burden not only on the risky premium, but also the saved wages and 
the risk-free retilrn. However, deferring consumption of saved wages from a 
light consumption year to a heavy consumption year does not increase one's 
overall standard of living. A similar argument can be made to the extent the 
taxpayer's investment return is limited to the normal risk-free rate of re-
tum.158 Thus, the cash flow tax imposed an excessive progressivity burden 
even taking into account the standard of living desire. In favorable contrast, 
the hybrid approach moderately imposed a progressivity burden only on the 
risky premium. The hybrid approach's consensus promise is evidenced by 
its simultaneous (i) imposition of a progressivity burden when risky returns 
materially enhance the living standard, in favorable contrast to the wage 
tax,159 and (ii) avoidance of the cash flow tax's undesirable progressivity 
burden on the deferred consumption of saved wages and risk-free returns.160 
155. A consumption tax would collect significant tax where lottery winnings funded heavy consump-
tion. In contrast, the wage tax would collect tax only on the lighter wages. 
156. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354 (discussing support for progressivity on "risky in-
vestment income"); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor 
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1975). 
157. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 92, at 1600-01. The consumption tax's potential implicit exemption 
of investment return might suggest the difference is merely in appearance. As shown herein, however, 
such implicit exemption can fail under a progressive rate structure. The after-tax results under a wage 
and consumption tax also might differ for reasons distinct from progressive rates. In particular, the 
consumption taxes do not implicitly exempt inframarginal returns. Taxpayers cannot un.do the explicit 
tax collection by increasing inframarginal investments since they are limited by above-market opportuni-
ties (after adjustment for risk). As a related practical matter, the difficulty in distinguishing inframarginal 
opportunities from earned income highlights a more general classification problem under the wage tax. 
Any labor income not properly classified as such under the wage tax avoids all tax, placing tremendous 
pressure on separating the labor and capital components. Consider receipts from technological inven-
tions like Microsoft DOS, mineral deposits such as a successful oil venture, increased rental value of 
land, or a successful advertising campaign. BRADFORD, supra note 127, at 130; Bradford, supra note 99, 
at 387; Weisbach, supra note 89, at 608 (noting problem, especially on patents); see also discussion 
supra note 147 (failure of taxpayers to adjust their portfolios); discussion supra note 141 (potential 
pricing changes). 
158. One might question drawing the line at precisely the risk-free rate of return, rather than the risk-
free rate plus a small percentage. Nonetheless, it provides a rough rule of thumb to separate out those 
returns that materially alter one's standard of living. See Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354. 
159. While this was a truncated two-year example, the point applies as well when a longer-term 
extraordinary return materially increases the living standard over an extended period. 
160. Thus, not only does the hybrid approach collect tax on the significant investment return, the 
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Finally, the hybrid approach has further responsiveness to any residual 
concerns of potential excess progressivity. As demonstrated above, risky 
returns can bear a progressivity burden under both the cash flow and hybrid 
approaches. Therefore, a bunching problem could arise under the hybrid 
approach as well as the cash flow tax if heavy risky returns were dispropor-
tionately consumed in a single year. 
Such concerns should be less pronounced under the hybrid approach 
than the cash flow tax for several reasons. First, as evidenced by Example 8, 
the hybrid approach reduces the bunching problem through its exclusion of 
the original investment amount and the risk-free return. In addition, the hy-
brid approach's flexibility provides a second source of protection. Taxpay-
ers could be provided an election to decline the use of available basis offset 
account balances in any year. Such unused amounts would carry forward 
indefinitely, with interest, as per the usual rules. This election would allow 
taxpayers to save their basis offset accounts for unusually heavy consump-
tion year(s) funded by risky returns; in return, they would voluntarily pay 
taxes in lower-rate years on consumption funded from savings. 161 Finally, 
consideration could be given to a relatively short-term averaging provision 
applicable in the year of death, looking back three to four years. As dis-
cussed above, a short-term averaging provision by itself inadequately re-
sponds to the deeper bunching problem under the cash flow tax.162 Nonethe-
less, a relatively modest averaging provision might work well in conjunc-
tion with the hybrid approach's other, self-contained, protections.163 
2. Non-Progressive Burdens under the Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid approach might impose an excess burden on risky returns 
relative to the cash flow tax for two reasons. The first relates to the assump-
tion above that T could increase his risky investments by borrowing at the 
burden also cannot be eliminated through portfolio adjustments when the standard of living increases 
(similar to the cash flow tax). Such inclusion (with potential progressivity on actual consumption levels) 
placates ability-to-pay objections to the wage tax (which fails to collect any tax at all on significant 
investment returns). This recognizes the desire to have actual standards of living impact the progressivity 
burden. On the other hand, the hybrid approach's exclusion of saved wages plus the risk-free return 
helps to protect against undesirable progressivity burdens attributable to unequal spending from year to 
year. 
161. This would provide taxpayers a structured way to obtain averaging. See discussion supra notes 
92-94 and accompanying text (for the difficulties of averaging provisions). If such election were not 
provided, sophisticated taxpayers might attempt to achieve a de facto election by manipulating the char-
acter of their income (i.e., converting investment return to wages would allow them to carry forward the 
exclusionary amount). Any risk that the additional carry forward could not be utilized in the future 
would be knowingly borne by the taxpayer. See also supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (for a 
more general discussion regarding the possibility of an unused basis offset account). 
162. Recall the potential excess burden on wages saved numerous years ago.· See discussion supra 
notes 86-95 and accompanying text. As discussed therein, a more responsive long-term averaging provi-
sion is more contentious as it raises deeper administrative and over breadth concerns. 
163. Successful resolution of the contentious averaging issue is a lesser requirement for the hybrid 
approach than the cash flow tax, given the hybrid approach's self-contained responses to the bunching 
problem. See discussion supra note 95. 
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risk-free rate. Assuming initially a flat-rate structure, an excess burden 
would be imposed on T under the hybrid approach where T's portfolio ad-
justment required borrowing at a rate above the risk-free rate. This results 
conceptually since T receives compensation on the corresponding basis off-
set account at only the risk-free rate.164 No such burden arises under the 
cash flow tax since T can make the necessary portfolio adjustment by in-
vesting the full pretax wages. 
The following factors, however, should minimize this excess tax con-
cern under the hybrid approach. 165 First, the risk-free rate provides the pre-
cise adjustment to the extent the taxpayer would have purchased some risk-
free assets under the cash flow (or wage) tax. In such cases, taxpayers need 
not borrow to increase their risky investments under the hybrid approach. 
Instead, taxpayers can use the cash that would have funded risk-free assets 
under the cash flow tax. 166 Second, taxpayers might be able to offset the 
explicit tax collection by purchasing riskier assets, rather than purchasing an 
increased amount of the same risky investment. 167 Borrowing would not be 
necessary for such strategy. Third, explicit individualized borrowing for 
investment provides collateral that should reduce the actual borrowing 
rate. 168 Separately, the basis offset account can be conceptualized as a loan 
164. That is, compared to the cash flow tax, T pays tax earlier but receives interest at the risk-free 
rate. If the earlier tax collection forces T to borrow under the hybrid approach (to match the risky in-
vestment amount under the cash flow tax), the two systems will deviate unless T's borrowing rate on his 
loan matches the interest paid on the offsetting basis offset account balance. Recall Example 7 that 
assumed a flat fifty percent tax rate. T's $100,000 consumption under the cash flow tax matched the 
wage tax results (with its direct exemption of investment return). This resulted since T invested the full 
$100,000 of pretax wages in the risky stock. The hybrid approach matches the cash flow tax assuming T 
can borrow at the ten percent risk-free rate (as per Example 7). If Ts borrowing rate exceeded ten per-
cent, however, T would have less than $100,000 consumption since T's after-tax interest expense would 
increase. For instance, if T borrowed at a twenty percent rate, T would have only $97,500 consumption. 
T would owe (i) $60,000 to the lender ($50,000 x 1.2) and (ii) $42,500 to the government {50% x 
[$200,000 stock proceeds - ($60,000 to lender+ $55,000 basis offset account)]}. $200,000 stock pro-
ceeds - ($60,000 + $42,500) = $97,500. 
165. See also Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 72-73 n.93 for the suggestion that the cash flow tax, 
rather than the hybrid approach, has the more significant interest rate imprecision. In particular, a con-
sumption tax can be viewed as an implicit accrual tax on all wealth with an implicit exemption for the 
risk-free return. Under this conceptualization, the cash flow tax improperly allows taxpayers to borrow, 
implicitly, at the understated risk-free rate in a greater number of circumstances. Relative to the cash 
flow tax, the hybrid approach appropriately denies the below-market loan to taxpayers on saved wages. 
166. Consider again Example 7, but now assume under the wage tax that T would invest only 
$25,000 in the risky stock. The remaining $25,000 after-tax wages would have been invested in risk-free 
treasury notes. Under the hybrid and cash flow taxes, T needs to increase his risky investments to 
$50,000 (doubling the $25,000 risky investment he would have made under the wage tax). T no longer 
would need to borrow under the hybrid approach to make the portfolio investment. Instead, he could 
invest the full $50,000 of after-tax wages in the stock (effectively reducing his risk-free investments to 
zero). Also see the comparable analysis of the income tax at Example 5. 
167. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 38, at 44 (taxpayers can adjust portfolio in many ways, in-
cluding changing proportion of risky assets, borrowing, or simply finding riskier investments); see also 
Chorvat, supra note 141. In addition, publicly traded options might provide some implicit borrowing 
opportunities at approximately the risk-free rate. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 605-09 (5th ed. 1996). 
168. See Engler, supra note 27, at 195. But see Cunningham, supra note 38, at 37 n.72 (stating that 
margin loans to wealthy bear interest at rates ranging from .75% to 4% above the federal funds rate). 
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from the taxpayer to the government. 169 Such conceptualization arguably 
supports use of the government's borrowing rate, the risk-free rate, even if 
the taxpayer incurs higher borrowing costs in making its investments. 170 
Finally, the interest adjustment to the basis offset account could be in-
creased to the risk-free rate plus a small percentage (in the range of one to 
three percent).171 
As evidenced by the following example, the hybrid approach also could 
impose an excess burden relative to the cash flow tax due to losses. 
Example 9: T earns a $100,000 salary on 12/31/01. T invests all (af-
ter-tax) wages in a risky stock, which loses twenty percent of its 
value over the one-year investment period. T consumes aJl available 
proceeds on 12/31/02. The tax rate is a flat fifty percent. 
Under the cash flow tax, T invests $100,000 in the stock, selling one 
year later for $80,000. The $80,000 proceeds are taxable, leaving $40,000 
of consumption.172 Contrast the hybrid approach. First, recall that T in-
creased the original stock investment to $100,000 by borrowing $50,000 (at 
the ten percent risk-free rate) since T's after tax wages were only $50,000 
under the hybrid approach. T would not owe any additional tax on the stock 
sale for $80,000; both the $55,000 debt repayment and the $55,000 basis 
offset account are deductible against the stock proceeds.173 After using 
$55,000 of the stock proceeds to repay the lender, T has only $25,000 cash 
available for consumption, $15,000 less than under the cash flow tax. 
169. Recall the notion of the hybrid approach as an advance collection system vis-a-vis the cash flow 
tax. As such, .tax is paid in advance under the hybrid approach with the interest adjustment on the basis-
offset account compensating for the advance payment. 
170. See Michael Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 308-11 (1996) 
(theorizing that even though the lending· arrangement is involuntary, prejudgment interest in litigation 
context should be assessed at the borrowing rate of the defendant-the implicit borrower). Some issues 
arise in using the government's risk-free rate in the hybrid approach context since (i) a portion of the 
basis recovery account might expire unused (see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text), (ii) the 
basis might not be used for many years, (iii) tax law changes might deprive taxpayers recovery of the 
basis offset account, and (iv) tax rates might change. The following responses minimize these imperfec-
tions. The hybrid approach minimizes the first issue by netting all of the taxpayer's investments, plus 
unusable amounts could be reimbursed. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. Further minimi-
zation occurs if a wealth transfer tax is integrated into the hybrid approach, since the basis offset account 
could be used at death to reduce the wealth transfer base. See discussion supra note 88 and accompany-
ing text. A blended risk-free rate (equally weighting short-term, mid-term, and long-term risk-free rates) 
would address the second concern. Fair transition allowance for existing tax basis in the move to a con-
sumption tax responds to the third issue by providing greater comfort in relying on tax benefits going 
forward. See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 129, at 363 (lack of transition relief has cost of offsetting 
expectations regarding future tax policy). 
171. Only a slight bump should be considered given the arguments above favoring the risk-free rate. 
Compare the provision of interest to taxpayers on refunds at the government's short-term risk-free rate 
plus three percent. I.R.C. § 662l(a)(l) (2003). Utilizing individualized borrowing rates raises adminis-
trative issues (for example, determining which debt was incurred in response to the hybrid approach's 
tax on saved wages). 
172. This is the same result as under the wage tax. Under the wage tax, T invests only $50,000 in the 
stock. The twenty percent decline leaves $40,000. 
173. Both calculations are $50,000 x 1.1. 
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However, T's remaining basis-offset account of $30,000 should mini-
mize concerns over this shortfall.174 The remaining account balance allows 
T to avoid $15,000 of tax on $30,000 of other consumption. Even if T does 
not have other current consumption funded from savings, the unused basis 
offset account carries forward. The interest adjustment protects against time 
value of money dilution.175 Thus, the loss scenario primarily is problematic 
only where T's portfolio over time provides an overall rate of return less 
than the risk-free rate.176 If so, T's savings available for consumption would 
be less than the basis offset account carry forward, thereby negating the 
account's full value. 177 The historic tendency of risky portfolios to provide 
returns in excess of the risk-free rate (over sufficient time frames), however, 
should reduce this concern.178 Finally, compensating taxpayers for unusable 
basis offset account balances could provide additional comfort.179 
In sum, the hybrid approach could impose an excess burden relative to 
the cash flow tax for two reasons under a flat rate structure. As discussed 
above, however, a variety of factors should minimize such concerns. In ad-
dition, Subpart IV.F summarizes how the advantages of the hybrid approach 
relative to the cash flow tax outweigh these concerns. 180 
174. The tax base is calculated as the excess of (i) the $80,000 stock proceeds less (ii) the sum of (iii) 
the $55,000 debt repayment plus the $55,000 basis offset account. The deductions therefore exceed the 
inclusion by $30,000, creating a deduction carry forward of $30,000. Alternatively, the $55,000 debt 
repayment reduces the taxable stock proceeds to $25,000 ($80,000 - $55,000). Only $25,000 of the 
$55,000 basis offset account is needed to offset that remaining amount, thereby leaving an unused basis 
offset account of $30,000. 
175. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of the time value of money). 
176. But see discussion supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (regarding possible understate-
ment of the interest adjustment where the taxpayer incurs borrowing costs). 
177. The basis-offset account only has value to the extent it can be deducted against savings with-
drawals for consumption. Taxpayers also could receive less than full value if the basis offset account 
were utilized in a tax year where the rate was lower than the rate imposed on the saved wages in the 
wage year. Providing an election to taxpayers to defer use of their basis offset account would help to 
minimize such concerns. See discussion supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
178. Risk-free assets by definition provide a return equal to the risk-free rate. Risky assets have an 
expected return in excess of the risk-free rate due to the premium for bearing risk. BREALEY & MYERS, 
supra note 167, at ch. 8. Thus, this possibility of unused basis should be a lesser concern under the 
hybrid approach than a similar concern under a suggested cash flow transition approach that would block 
the use of transition deductions against savings withdrawals. In that context, unusable basis could arise 
even where the taxpayer earned a portfolio return equal to, or greater than, the risk-free rate. See discus-
sion supra note 131. 
179. For instance, the government could compensate the estates of taxpayers who die with unused 
basis offset accounts. Waiting until death has some appeal since death conclusively establishes how 
much, if any, of the basis offset account turns out to be unusable. While an earlier payment also has 
appeal (to get cash directly into the taxpayer's hands), it raises an administrative issue as to when tax-
payers should be allowed to convert their basis offset accounts to cash. Another complexity concerns the 
amount of compensation to be provided for unused basis offset account balances. The theoretically 
correct response arguably would look to the tax rate that applied to the original saved wage amount. 
Administrative concerns counsel in favor of a standard rate structure. Again, taxpayers would be com-
pensated for the time value of money through the interest adjustment to the basis offset account. 
180. In addition, as discussed supra in notes 110-14, the likely "tax prepaid" treatment of certain 
consumer debt would allow some limited tax minimization strategies under the cash flow tax. Thus, 
taxpayer burdens under the cash flow tax also could vary in accordance with individualized borrowing 
rates. See also discussion irifra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (regarding how the income tax has 
similar excess tax possibilities). 
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E. Complexity Issues 
This Subpart compares the complexity of the different taxes. The hybrid 
approach's dual application (to both wages and saving withdrawals) initially 
might appear significantly more complex than the single-application cash 
flow tax. 181 For instance, the basis offset account, with the interest adjust-
ment, coordinates the hybrid approach's two components. A similar mecha-
nism would be needed under the cash flow tax, however, to address savings 
held at transition, albeit for a more limited purpose.182 Furthermore, tax col-
lection on savings withdrawals has relatively greater significance under the 
cash flow tax, necessitating additional enforcement efforts.183 The cash flow 
tax also would generate additional complexity to the extent it adopted ex-
tensive averaging provisions. 184 
Consider also the areas of reduced complexity under the hybrid ap-
proach relative to the current income tax. 185 Under current law, saved wages 
generally are taxed on receipt even if saved. Since investment income is 
calculated separately for each asset, taxpayers must track their basis in each 
asset. In contrast, the hybrid approach would have a single basis account for 
all investments.186 The tax return itself would serve a valuable record-
keeping function by tracking all unrecovered basis for all investment assets 
in a single aggregated account. 187 As a related point, partial asset disposi-
181. A stand-alone wage tax is relatively attractive on administrative grounds. As discussed supra in 
note 157 and accompanying text, however, the wage tax is unacceptable for other reasons. In addition, 
the wage tax would require additional policing efforts on wage characterization given the greater pres-
sure on the wage/investment distinction. 
182. See discussion supra Part IV.C. While the provision would have a more limited scope, com-
plexities related to the determination of the interest rate adjustment would be comparable. 
183. See discussion supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
184. See discussion supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
185. The hybrid approach might add complexity for taxpayers who save small amounts solely 
through simple savings arrangements, such as interest-bearing bank accounts. It is these taxpayers, 
however, who currently face relatively greater burdens on their investment income since such interest 
income does not receive either the deferral or preferential rate benefits. Most of the simplifications 
relative to current law stem from the cash flow treatment of investments. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 
70, at 1152-53; Graetz, supra note 92, at 1610. 
186. As discussed below, separate basis record keeping might be necessary for consumer dur-
ables/homes. This does not distinguish the cash flow tax from the hybrid approach. As discussed at notes 
111-12 and accompanying text, the treatment of consumer durables should be similar under the two 
forms of consumption taxation. 
More generally, the need for separate basis calculations might appear prominent if wealth transfers 
were not treated as consumption. If that were the case, the transferor's basis offset account might appear 
artificially high absent a reduction equal to the specific basis of the transferred property. As discussed 
supra in notes 86-90, independent reasons support the inclusion of wealth transfers as consumption to 
the transferor. Even if wealth transfers were not treated as consumption, the need for widespread specific 
basis record keeping could be avoided by providing that a transferor's basis offset account would be 
decreased by the value of any transferred property. More narrow rules could be considered to address 
potential under valuation situations, for example, high-basis assets likely to be transferred at understated 
values. The hybrid approach need not eliminate all valuation concerns; the cash flow tax and current law 
also present valuation issues on wealth transfers. See, e.g., supra note 89; I.R.C. § 1015 (2003). 
187. Under current law, taxpayers might have uncertainty as to their actual basis in each separate 
investment asset where the asset was acquired long ago. Additional uncertainties could arise where the 
asset was acquired in separate transactions over time and/or where a portion of the asset was sold at 
different times. 
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tions raise complexity issues under the income tax; how much of the tax-
payer's total purchase price should be allowed to offset the partial sales 
proceeds. 188 
The hybrid approach' s cash flow treatment of investments also elimi-
nates other complexities under the realization-based income tax. Under cur-
rent law, sophisticated taxpayers attempt to (i) convert ordinary income into 
lower-rate capital gains and/or (ii) avoid the realization tax by transferring 
the economic burdens/benefits of ownership without an actual sale. 189 This 
creates increasingly complicated situations, as current law must police the 
artificial ordinary/capital and realization distinctions. 190 Additional issues 
arise under the realization income tax regarding the propriety of taxing real-
ized gain where the proceeds consist of either comparable property or the 
buyer's note. Current deferral provisions for qualifying installment sales 
and "like-kind" exchanges present additional complexities. 191 
A final point concerns in-year calculations. Application of the hybrid 
approach's interest adjustment to investments/withdrawals occurring within 
a tax year raises complexity issues. In theory, interest should run from the 
tax payment date on saved wages until the savings withdrawal date, thereby 
raising administrative issues. However, comparable in-year complexities 
arise under both the cash flow tax and income tax. For instance, year-end 
savings followed by a withdrawal early the following year raises an interest-
free deferral possibility under the cash flow tax, absent specific tracking of 
the saving and/or withdrawal dates. 192 Furthermore, as discussed below, 
188. For instance, under current law, taxpayers selling only a portion of shares held in a corporation 
or mutual fund company can claim to have sold the specific shares purchased at the highest price. This 
reduces the reported gain by increasing the portion of the overall basis allowed as an offset. Critics argue 
the provision is too generous. Compare the Clinton administration's more complicated provision allow-
ing basis recovery equal to the average cost basis in all shares. White House Statutory Language; Title 
IX, Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 9511, Subtitle E: Corporate Reforms and Other Revenue 
Provisions, 96 TNT 56-6, Mar. 20, 1996. Cash flow taxation of investments eliminates this arbitrary 
distinction. Partial sales proceeds are included only to the extent they are consumed rather than rein-
vested. 
189. For a straightforward attempt to transfer the economic burdens and benefits without an actual 
sale, consider the short against the box. A taxpayer holding appreciated stock (e.g., 100 shares), borrows 
100 other shares in the same company and sells "short" the borrowed shares (while retaining his own 
actual shares). Technically the taxpayer retains ownership in his actual shares although he eliminates the 
economic benefits and burdens of ownership (since any gain (loss) on his own "long" stock position is 
perfectly offset by loss (gain) on the short stock position). The short against the box strategy was eventu-
ally shut down by I.R.C. § 1259 (2002). Nonetheless, it illustrates how some taxpayers inevitably find 
the gaps in the tax law. 
190. See I.RC. § 1258 (treating certain gains on the sale of capital assets as ordinary income); id. § 
1259 (forcing gain recognition in the absence of actual sale in certain cases); see also supra note 46. 
191. I.R.C. § 453 (installment sales); id. § 1031 (like-kind exchanges). There are additional "non-
recognition" provisions. E.g., I.RC. § 354 (stock exchanges which qualify as a "reorganization"). In the 
other direction, current law occasionally requires the reporting of income even before actual sale. E.g., 
the "original issue discount" rules at I.RC. § 1271. These divergent tax rules add complexity; i.e., the 
rules must be applied to relevant transactions and taxpayers analyze possible restructurings to avoid the 
rules. 
192. For instance, deferring consumption from the last day of year O 1 to the first day of year 02 
defers the tax liability from year O 1 to year 02 absent specific tracing rules. (The benefit of any such 
deferral turns on the workings of the estimated payment regime, which also depends on the degree of 
complexity it undertakes in tracking the specific timing of transactions within a year.) Another in-year 
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accounting conventions could address the in-year complexity issues under 
the hybrid approach. 
The hybrid approach also eliminates an area of in-year complexity un-
der the income tax. Because a decline in asset value constitutes an expense, 
investments in wasting assets require an annual depreciation allowance un-
der an income tax. In-year difficulties arise under the income tax since, in 
theory, depreciation allowances should begin upon the placement of prop-
erty in service.193 Given the immediate deduction for the entire purchase 
price, the hybrid approach, like the cash flow tax, eliminates the need for 
depreciation. Separately, the current income tax treatment of this compara-
ble in-year difficulty suggests one way to handle the in-year interest calcula-
tions under the hybrid approach. General accounting conventions could 
ha.lance administrative concerns and precision, with an override provided 
for abusive cases. For instance, one such convention under the hybrid ap-
proach treats all savings withdrawals as made in the middle of the tax year, 
absent significantly disproportionate early-year withdrawals.194 
problem arises under the cash flow tax if wage withholding is maintained. While savers are entitled to 
refunds of any such withheld taxes, over taxation results, absent interest payments for the time lapse 
between the withholding and refund dates. See discussion supra note 107. Another problem arises under 
the cash flow tax if tax rates are expressed on a tax-inclusive basis (i.e., no deduction for taxes paid). In 
this instance, taxpayers who defer paying taxes on year 01 consumption to year 02 reduce the tax cost 
(deferring the tax payment allows an extra deductible investment in year 01). While a tax-exclusive rate 
responds to such concern, this raises a potential offsetting optics concern since the tax-exclusive rate 
appears as a significantly higher stated rate. Graetz, supra note 92, at 1583. With some additional com-
plexity, an alternative approach might treat unpaid taxes at year-end as savings withdrawals. 
· Similarly, both the cash flow tax and the hybrid approach need to protect against tax avoidance pos-
sibilities involving below-market loans between related parties. A below-market loan from father to 
child appears to raise a unique problem under the hybrid approach since, absent a protective provision, 
phantom deductions would accrue to the lender while the loan is outstanding. A similar issue also arises 
under the cash flow tax, since the transaction may generate a current "investment" deduction. Further, 
below-market loans raise issues under the income tax. For the current law response, see I.R.C. § 7872 
(2002) (which can be used under the consumption tax systems, with appropriate modifications). 
193. I.R.C. § 168(d)(l)-(2) (2002) finesses this complexity by deeming depreciable property, other 
than realty, as purchased in the middle of the year. This effectively allows six months of depreciation 
allowances for the initial year, regardless of the specific day within the year that the property is placed in 
service. This six-month allowance is overridden where substantial purchases of such depreciable prop-
erty occur in the last three months of the taxable year. Id. § 168(d)(3). The depreciation rules also finesse 
complexities in determining actual declines in property by making assumptions about useful lives and 
value decreases. See id. § 168(b),(c). For additional in-year complexities under current law, see the 
current estimated tax payment rules at I.R.C. § 6654 (2002) (under which tax payments for a given year 
can be made as late as April 15 of the following year). 
194. Compare the current depreciation rules discussed supra note 193. Under a mid-year convention, 
savings withdrawals are deemed made on June 30. As such, in determining basis offset account balances 
available against current year savings withdrawals, the balance carry forward preliminarily receives a 
sixcmonth adjustment. Any remaining balance (after reduction for the current year's use) then receives 
the remaining six-month adjustment. A mid-point rule for taxes paid during the current year deems taxes 
paid in August/September (since taxes might not be paid until April 15 of the following year, assuming 
retention of the current timing rules). If so, new account balances receive only three to four months of 
interest adjustment in the year of creation. While a mid-point approach generally minimizes imprecision, 
potential manipulations (like disproportjonate withdrawals early in the year) suggest consideration of 
stricter rules. Possibilities include: (i) specific disallowance provisions (such as reducing the in-year 
interest adjustment where significantly disproportionate withdrawals occur early in the year), or (ii) more 
general in-year interest disallowance (such as no interest adjustment on carry forward amounts used 
during year against saving withdrawals, and/or no in-year interest on new account balances). Assuming a 
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In sum, the hybrid approach adds some complexity in certain areas rela-
tive to either the cash flow or income tax. Given the offsetting areas of 
complexity reduction under the hybrid approach, the overall complexity 
case is far less certain. The remaining excess complexity, if any, should be 
balanced against the hybrid approach's other comparative advantages, 
which are summarized in the next Subpart. 
F. Summary of the Hybrid Approach' s Appeal 
This Subpart summarizes the consensus potential of the hybrid ap-
proach. Subpart IV .F. 1 discusses why the hybrid approach should appeal to 
those favoring, at least in theory, a consumption tax. Subpart IV.F.2 ex-
plains why the hybrid approach also should appeal to theoretic income tax 
proponents. 
1. Appeal to Theoretic Consumption Tax Advocates 
Subparts IV.A and D highlighted one reason why a progressive cash 
flow consumption tax might have difficulty in satisfying even those who 
favor, in theory, a consumption tax. The desired consumption tax system 
must heed the occasionally conflicting desires to collect tax (i) independent 
of saving decisions and (ii) in accordance with the standard of living. The 
hybrid approach strikes a more desirable balance than the cash flow tax 
between the inevitable conflicts of these two competing consumption tax 
desires. In favorable contrast to the cash flow tax, the hybrid approach in-
corporates savings neutrality when the living standard is not at issue; i.e., 
the hybrid approach avoids imposing a progressivity burden on the deferred 
consumption of saved wages and the risk-free return thereon. On the other 
hand, the hybrid approach imposes a progressivity burden on savings when 
the living standard becomes relevant; for example, where significant risky 
returns fund a materially enhanced lifestyle. 195 Related thereto, bunching 
tax-inclusive rate, with no deduction for taxes paid, specific concern arises regarding taxpayers who 
defer payment of current-year taxes to the following year. Such deferral could free up assets for addi-
tional investments, thereby overstating the year-end basis offset account on which interest accrues the 
following year. In response, any current-year taxes not paid by year end could be deemed made from 
savings withdrawals on January I of the new year or December 31 of the prior year. The January I 
approach limits any excess interest accruals to the partial in-year adjustment, if any, for the prior year. 
The December 31 approach should eliminate any excess interest adjustment, albeit with some additional 
complexity (i.e., deeming savings withdrawals in the prior year requires an offsetting current year deduc-
tion). Separately, care is needed where offsetting withdrawals and savings occur on different days of the 
same year. 
195. Thus, the hybrid approach imposes a progressivity burden on both high wages and high invest-
ment returns. Some consumption tax proponents vacillate between progressivity on wages versus in-
vestment return. E.g., Rakowski, supra note 60; compare Bradford, supra note 99, at 384-85 (analyzing 
the "X-tax" which imposes progressivity only on wages), with DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS 
FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 122-23 (2d ed. 1984) (analyzing cash flow tax under which progressivity 
generally applies at the time of consumption). 
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concerns from risky returns are significantly narrower under the hybrid ap-
proach than the cash flow tax. 196 
Potential consumption tax proponents also might object to a form of 
consumption taxation, which raises serious implementation issues relative to 
the current structure. By maintaining tax collections on saved wages, the 
hybrid approach also responds to the transition, revenue, and tax avoid-
ance/evasion concerns under the cash flow tax. 197 
In sum, consumption tax proponents should favor the hybrid approach 
over the cash flow tax due to these combined benefits, which outweigh the 
hybrid approach's additional complexities, if any, and two possible areas of 
excess tax. 198 
2. Appeal to Theoretic Income Tax Proponents 
As discussed in Part III, those favoring an income tax should consider 
consumption taxation due to realization-based practical problems under the 
income tax. Ultimate acceptance of consumption taxation by this group is, 
however, contingent on comparable progressivity and the lack of offsetting 
practical concerns. The hybrid approach satisfies these criteria as well. 
The primary theoretic difference between the income tax and the con-
sumption tax is the income tax's excess burden on the risk-free investment 
return. In practice, however, the income tax unfairly taxes this relatively 
minor component of investment return. Realization-based gaps enable cer-
tain taxpayers to avoid completely, or minimize, the tax on risk-free re-
196. This occurs when high risky returns are consumed over a short time frame. The bunching con-
cerns narrow under the hybrid approach since saved wages and the risk-free return thereon are excluded 
from the adjusted cash flow base. Giving taxpayers control over the timing of such exclusionary deduc-
tions would further blunt any remaining bunching concerns under the hybrid approach. See discussion 
supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
197. A modified hybrid approach could more closely follow the cash flow tax on the progressivity 
issue by giving a "tax paid credit" carry forward for taxes paid on saved wages (in lieu of the basis offset 
account carry forward). This would appeal if the consumption tax consensus preferred the cash flow tax 
on the progressivity issue yet wanted to incorporate the hybrid approach's responsiveness to the cash 
flow tax's other impediments. Under this modified hybrid approach, a preliminary tax liability is calcu-
lated by applying the tax rates to the hybrid tax base without any basis offset account deduction. Tax-
payers reduce the preliminary tax by the (unused) tax paid credit carry forward, which equals taxes 
previously paid on saved wages, increased by an interest factor. Note that if the tax rate is expressed on a 
tax inclusive basis, the tax paid credit amount must be added to the tax base. 
198. As discussed above in Subpart IV.D.2, this potential excess tax under the hybrid approach 
relative to the cash flow tax arises where the risk-free rate: (i) exceeds the taxpayer's overall portfolio 
return or (ii) is less than the interest rate incurred in making a portfolio adjustment. As discussed therein, 
a variety of factors should narrow such excess tax concerns. In addition, the cash flow tax's undesirable 
progressivity impact, as described above, presents a more general structural problem. Finally, in any 
specific risky return case, the cash flow tax's excess progressivity burden could match or exceed any 
potential excess burden under the hybrid approach. For instance, consider again the example in note 164 
showing the hybrid approach's excess burden where T borrowed at twice the risk-free rate under a flat 
fifty percent rate. Assume now that a higher sixty percent rate applies to amounts above $100,000. Ts 
consumption under the hybrid approach remains $97,500 because Ts tax base in both years remains at 
$100,000 or less. Under the cash flow tax, however, T faces the progressive rate when the asset is sold 
for $200,000. Ts tax bill goes from $100,000 (.5 x $200,000) to $110,000 [(.5 x $100,000) + (.6 x 
$100,000)]. Accordingly, Ts after-tax consumption decreases to $90,000. T therefore consumes more 
under the hybrid approach notwithstanding the excess borrowing costs. 
2003] A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals 1247 
turns.199 Furthermore, these realization-based loopholes allow select taxpay-
ers to reduce the tax burden on other income.200 Therefore, even if one fa-
vors, in theory, a tax on the risk-free return, the hybrid approach should be 
attractive. The hybrid approach removes what is, in practice, an inequitable 
tax on risk-free returns. It also largely eliminates the spillover problems 
affecting the remaining tax base.201 
The hybrid approach accomplishes this without sacrificing the income 
tax's direct progressivity burden on high wage earners who spread con-
sumption over a number of years. In addition, the hybrid approach imposes 
progressivity on enhanced lifestyles funded by significant investment re-
turns. 
Finally, the hybrid approach's potential imperfections highlighted above 
should not weaken its attractiveness to theoretic income tax proponents. The 
income tax has comparable, if not greater, flaws in each such area. For in-
stance, home acquisition indebtedness might present some tax deferral pos-
sibilities under the hybrid approach.202 In favorable contrast to the deferral 
strategies under current law, however, market-rate interest is charged for 
such deferral under the hybrid approach. In addition, while taxpayers ulti-
199. The realization income tax imposes the excess burden on risk-free returns only on those who 
realize income before consumption. See discussion supra note 62 and accompanying text. In addition, 
under current law, the attempted burden unfairly varies with the inflation rate. See Cunningham, supra 
note 38, at 39-43. 
200. The direct realization problems include the interest-free deferral on unrealized gains and the 
selective disposition of only loss assets. See Subpart ill.A. Indirect realization problems flow from the 
reduced capital gains rate, primarily justified as a response to the lock-in issue under the realization 
requirement. The lower capital gains rate not only reduces the burden on all qualifying investment re-
turns, but also encourages "conversions" of ordinary rate income (such as labor and interest income) to 
capital gains. See supra notes 42, 189-90 and accompanying text. 
201. The hybrid approach eliminates (i) selective loss realization since losses are not deductible (see 
supra note 51 and accompanying text) and (ii) the leading justifications for the lower capital gains rate 
under the income tax (see supra note 52 and accompanying text). While the hybrid approach taxes wages 
when realized, the interest adjustment to the basis-offset account generally removes the timing signifi-
cance of such realization. Some discontinuity will remain to the extent the risk-free rate is understated. 
See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text. Taxpayers planning to avoid the adjusted cash flow 
component (for example, by expatriating) would benefit from avoiding wage realization. Nonetheless, as 
discussed at supra note 121, the wage component provides extra protection. Separately, although pro-
gressive rates provide an incentive to avoid high-wage years, an equivalent concern arises under the 
income tax. See supra note 105. 
Also contrast the suggested "income tax" approach of taxing investments only when aggregate with-
drawals exceed aggregate saved wages (i.e., a basis offset account without interest). See Andrews, supra 
note 70. This approach fails to address the (i) current tax on inflationary gains, and (ii) the realization 
distortion on saved wages. Increasing the saved wage account by inflation, rather than the higher risk-
free rate, provides a more limited response to the wage realization issue than the hybrid approach. As a 
related point, the hybrid approach has several advantages over asset-by-asset basis indexation. First, 
basis indexation is more complex, as the basis on each separate asset must be separately adjusted for 
inflation under a realization income tax. Second, it is likely that basis indexation would exclude debt (for 
both the creditor and debtor) due to complexity concerns and political realities. Such "partial" indexation 
allows tax arbitrage on debt-financed investments. See Engler, supra note 42, at 72-106. Third, the 
realization significance for invested capital is reduced, but not eliminated as under the hybrid approach. 
Finally, it provides a lesser response than the hybrid approach to the wage realization issue (the hybrid 
approach consistently provides the risk-free rate of return). Cf. Engler, supra note 27, at 186-90 (under 
certain assumptions, partial indexation adjusts at the short-term risk-free rate). 
202. See discussion supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. As discussed therein, provisions may 
limit this potential even in the first instance. 
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mately may default on such deferred liability under the hybrid approach, the 
realization income tax presents similar default possibilities in a broader 
range of circumstances.203 Also, consider the two ways in which the hybrid 
approach might impose an excess burden on risky returns relative to the 
cash flow tax. By taxing saved wages, the income tax, like the hybrid ap-
proach, imposes an excess burden where (i) portfolio adjustments require 
borrowing at higher individual rates204 and/or (ii) wages are invested in loss 
assets.205 
In sum, the hybrid approach would significantly improve various prob-
lem areas of current law, without the offsetting new concerns presented by 
the cash flow tax. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Dissatisfaction with the current income tax system is increasing among 
academics and government officials. Shifting to the most logical replace-
ment, a consumption tax, raises several prominent questions. First, can a 
consumption tax be designed with the progressivity necessary to satisfy the 
desire for a redistributive tax system? Second, would the resulting progres-
sive consumption tax appropriately balance the conflicting desires of con-
sumption tax proponents to collect tax (i) without regard to savings deci-
sions and (ii) based on standards of living? Third, would the resulting pro-
gressive consumption tax satisfy those favoring the income tax in theory but 
frustrated by its long-standing practical problems? Finally, as a related mat-
ter, can the foregoing attributes be achieved without raising deep transition 
concerns or other intractable issues? 
The hybrid approach satisfactorily responds to all such inquiries. First, 
the hybrid approach would achieve meaningful redistribution through its 
dual progressivity burden on high wages and heavy consumption funded by 
significant investment retums.206 Second, the hybrid approach would suc-
cessfully moderate between the savings neutrality and living standard de-
sires, favoring each when most compelling. Third, the hybrid approach 
should appeal even if one favors, in theory, the income tax's potential ex-
203. See discussion supra note 118. 
204. Recall Example 2, discussed supra in Subpart II.A. 
205. The loss scenario differs somewhat for the hybrid and income taxes. As discussed above, the 
issue under the hybrid approach arises where the portfolio return is less than the risk-free rate. In con-
trast, the issue arises under the income tax only for losses. On the other hand, the hybrid approach less-
ens the concern by providing an interest adjustment-through the basis offset account-on unused losses 
that carry forward. · 
On balance, these potential burdens are generally considered undesirable, even by those commenta-
tors favoring an income tax in theory; they unfairly burden taxpayers with higher ·borrowing rates and/or 
an inability to use tax losses. E.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 
TAX L. REv. 423,429 (2000) (discussing inability to use losses); Cunningham, supra note 38, at 35-39 
( discussing excess borrowing rates). In any event, regardless of whether one ultimately favors these 
burdens, they generally do not distinguish the income and hybrid taxes. 
206. This duality can appeal to someone favoring either a consumption tax or an income tax in the-
ory. See discussion supra Subparts IV.F.1 and F.2. 
2003] A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals 1249 
cess burden on the risk-free return. In practice, loopholes arising from this 
attempted tax of the risk-free return allow well-advised taxpayers to avoid 
tax not just on the risk-free return, but on other, more significant items as 
well. The hybrid approach would relinquish the risk-free tax, which has 
proven inequitable in practice, while strengthening the remaining, more 
significant tax base. Finally, the hybrid approach's wage tax component 
addresses the transition, revenue, and tax avoidance concerns that impede 
the cash flow tax, the alternative progressive consumption tax. 
In sum, the hybrid approach addresses both the deep structural flaws of 
the current system as well as the most prominent cash flow tax concerns. As 
shown above, the new hybrid approach combines significant substantive 
benefits, consensus-forming potential, and relative transition ease. This new 
hybrid structure, therefore, has real potential to break the current deadlock 
between the status quo income tax and the conventional consumption tax. 
